Medicare SNF Cuts: Fact, Fiction, Probability
In early May, CMS released its proposed rule for FY 2012 concerning Medicare PPS reimbursement for SNFs. As most followers of the industry from investors, to operators to developers know by now, CMS dropped a “bomb” to the industry indicating bluntly, a warning of a parity adjustment (reimbursement or payment reduction) of 11.3% or $3.94 billion. In typical convoluted CMS fashion, the logic behind this foreboding news is scattered; an analysis of the agency’s inability to adequately anticipate provider behavior, utilization patterns, and to appropriately create a reimbursement mechanism that ties the cost of care required by current SNF patients with the costs and delivery systems necessary to provide the care.
Initially, the interpretation from many inside the industry was that CMS was overreacting, using only one-quarter’s worth of claims data to substantiate a “sky is falling” conclusion. More recently, six month’s worth of claims data became available and analysis proved the trend correct and even a shade worse or better stated, more prevalent than originally assumed. In short, the implementation of MDS 3.0 and RUGs IV missed the budget mark (budget or expenditure neutral) by $2.1 billion or 16%.
In the last week to ten days, the OIG (Office of Inspector General) for CMS stepped into the debate, stating its opinion that the overpayments must be stopped immediately. Interpreting the OIG’s qualification of “immediately”, the timeframe at issue is next fiscal year. In essence, the core of the problem continues to be the structural flaws within the RUGs system predominantly, that disproportionately pays more for rehabilitation therapy than for other primary care modalities. A major intent of CMS during the switch from RUGs III to IV was a reallocation of the incentives (higher payments) from therapy to other resident care requirements. Suffice to state, the methodology failed. Below is a simple illustration of how on a pure rate basis, the RUGs III to IV therapy categories compare.
| Table 1: Average Amount That Medicare Pays SNFs per Diem for Each Level of Therapy, FYs 2010 and 2011 | ||||
| Level of Therapy | Number of Therapy Minutes Provided During Assessment Period | Average per Diem Payment FY 2010 | Average per Diem Payment FY 2011 | Percentage Increase From FY 2010 toFY 2011 |
| Low | 45 to 149 | $288 | $430 | 49% |
| Medium | 150 to 324 | $369 | $488 | 32% |
| High | 325 to 499 | $364 | $532 | 46% |
| Very high | 500 to 719 | $418 | $594 | 42% |
| Ultra high | 720 or more | $528 | $699 | 32% |
| Source: OIG analysis of unadjusted per diem urban rates for FYs 2010 and 2011. See 74 Fed. Reg. 40288, 40298–40299 (Aug. 11, 2009) and 75 Fed. Reg. 42886, 42894–42895 (Jul. 22, 2010). | ||||
Reviewed on-the-face, it is logical to see how CMS could miss the targeted expenditure mark by the margin it has, even in-spite of the “methodology” changes that occurred in the conversion from 2.0 to 3.0 and RUGs III to IV. Providers, being logical creatures of certain habits, moved accordingly to grab the payments at the highest attainable levels or in short, fulfilled the economic axiom of, “what gets rewarded (paid for) gets done”. The expectation on the part of CMS that utilization trends would fall-off from the higher paying therapy categories, necessitating a higher re-balanced rate to negate a revenue “shock” to the SNFs was poorly thought through.
Quickly reviewing “what” occurred to produce such a variance from assumption to actual is easy. Getting to the core takes a bit more thought and digging. In summary fashion; CMS assumed that by restructuring how therapy minutes were calculated for concurrent therapy (therapy provided to two individuals) from a two-equals one basis to an equal half, would reduce the ability of providers to meet the higher per minute category qualifications, necessitating more one to one therapy sessions (the previous concurrent therapy rules allowed providers to have two people in the same therapy session with the total session time allocated to both participants equally). Similarly, CMS assumed that ending the look-back provision to establish reference dates and care requirements would more accurately stage the resident’s acuity and care needs to the point of admission (or proximally forward from admission) to the SNF. Additional tightening of the extensive services qualifier rules would also, as assumed, reduce higher RUG scores and thus, payments. Of these changes and assumptions, only the look-back period changes combined with the changes in qualification for extensive services provided any material classification changes (lower payments) though such changes were far less in total dollars than the dollar increase CMS imputed on the corresponding RUGs III to RUGs IV therapy payments. Providers however, merely switched to the remaining “open ground”, providing more therapy on an individual basis and most noticeably, on a group basis. On a group basis, minutes are counted collectively, not split in equal parts among the participants – a provision CMS did not change from RUGs III to RUGs IV. While the modifications made to the extensive services qualifier and the look-back period provision did impact providers, CMS completely misunderstood the application and prevalence within the provider community of these two provisions under RUGs III and as played-out, found that providers could still code residents into higher payment groups/categories in spite of the changes.
To understand what might happen next, one needs to look at how this mess occurred. As I’ve typically found, the answer lies in both camps; providers and CMS. In my recent work, its clear that many providers don’t understand the transition from RUGs III to RUGs IV and as I have looked at “oodles” of Medicare claims, I dare say a large number are still frought with ”up-coding” and questionable therapy-minute counting practices. This is not to say that the whole of the industry has behaved in this fashion but arguably, and CMS understands this as do both major trade associations, providers have not totally changed their business models to reflect the changes in payment systems. One needs only to look at how claims trended under RUGs III and how they now are trending under RUGs IV. The trend is too consistent to support an assumption of SNFs; a) staffing substantially more therapy personnel to capture the minute requirements via individual treatment or, b) SNFs moved a sizable share of their Medicare case-load into group therapy. The latter, while I’m certain it has occurred on a broad basis as the OIG report suggests, is problematic from a care delivery perspective for a large range of diagnoses that truly require individual therapy sessions.
CMS continues to remain fundamentally inept at developing reimbursement systems that provide adequate payment for the care and services required by SNF residents. I have yet to see, across my 25 years in the industry, any period or any system devised by CMS that didn’t under-support or over-support, one type or category of patient versus others. It is also illogical that CMS cannot develop the audit tools and claims management infrastructure that both educates providers and pre-emptively kicks-back claims clearly evidencing up-coding. I am consistently amazed at “what” gets paid and for how long. In short, CMS is apparently willing to consistently miss the mark, make wholesale adjustments and reallocation of dollars, only to over-correct past inconsistencies while producing new ones. Such will not doubt occur with this latest blunder.
While I won’t claim to have a crystal ball in terms of forecasting “what happens” next, experience and ongoing dialogue with individuals on Capital Hill and within CMS gives me some decent insights. With debt ceiling/deficit reduction talks mired in politics, it is unlikely any substantial cuts to entitlement spending are forthcoming. Senate Democrats and the President are sufficiently dug-in on cutting Medicare spending by any measurable amount thus the target on this issue (Medicare SNF spending) has moved away from the current political fracas. The remaining Washington impetus for cutting SNF reimbursement resides within CMS. In spite of the OIG’s report, enacting cuts of the magnitude suggested is a political issue. CMS can propose all the spending cuts its desires but Congress has the final say. Rarely if ever, although given today’s climate an exception may be possible, has Congress sustained reimbursement cuts of this magnitude. Synthesized, my view of what happens next, based on what I know to date, is:
- Providers and their trade association are willing to capitulate to a modest adjustment in the therapy categories. This symbolic give-back will play well politically. Net of a market-basket/inflation update, cuts of 2% to 4% are possible in a “cut scenario”.
- In a scenario that involves no real cuts, rates will be flat. CMS will institute additional refinements and perhaps, even re-calibrate or fine tune payments by RUGs category, moving dollars within the RUGs system, without reducing payments. In this scenario, the attempt on the part of CMS to is to “patch the potholes” and let the system itself reduce payments via tightening the requirements and re-allocating dollars within the RUGs categories.
- A most probable scenario involves, as is typical, a bit of both. CMS will cut the therapy rates using some language about re-basing. At the same time, a series of corrections will be made regarding the counting of minutes for group therapy, assessment windows, etc. Overall, payments to SNFs across all RUGs IV categories will be flat or targeted as a reduction equaling 2-4%. The pull-back on the therapy RUGs rates could be as steep as 8% to 10%. Even at this level, the remaining rate will be higher than the former RUG III rate.
Accountable Care Organizations: A Post-Acute Perspective
Suffice to say, I am behind in getting this post “out”. My best intentions of a month or so ago were quickly dashed by other more pressing commitments. Nonetheless, I did read the proposed regulations as produced by the Department of Health and Human Services/CMS on April 7 and worked through a stack of research on the subject of Accountable Care Organizations; loosely coined by me, the Good, the Bad and the Ugly.
In the purest of definitions, easily lost within the DHHS/CMS proposed regulations, Accountable Care Organizations (ACO) are about improving patient care outcomes and satisfaction while reducing cost or expenditures for care. At the core of the premise about “why” and “how” an ACO would work in achieving better care, higher satisfaction and lower costs are three key assumptions or “truisms”.
- Best practices via algorithms and care pathways exist in sufficient supply, tested and proven, to reduce the variability that drives higher cost and lower satisfaction for a large and growing number of common patient care issues.
- Satisfaction is directly correlated to increased patient knowledge and communication, reduced bureaucracy at the provider level (fewer redundant steps) and better outcomes, more directly delivered and/or attained.
- Providers, properly incentivized to focus on outcomes and satisfaction will gravitate toward any and all steps and measures that improve outcomes and satisfaction and resultingly, deliver better and cheaper (less costly) care. The key is developing the right level of incentives that drive provider behavior in the desired direction.
For years, I’ve written and lectured repeatedly that bending the cost curve or lowering the overall costs of health care in the U.S. system must first begin at the core of the issue; the system of reward. A simple economic axiom defines this best; “what gets rewarded gets done”. Fundamentally, the U.S. health system has rewarded in the form of payment, procedures, pills, tests, and surgical (or surgical-like) interventions at the expense of prevention and wellness/care management. In spite of an enormous and growing body of evidence that much of the escalation of costs (steepening of the “curve”) in the U.S. is driven by chronic conditions poorly managed and lacking in early detection and prevention strategies, funding has remained skewed toward treatment practices that are technical and predominantly surgical or interventional in nature. The result is poor to minimal access for Type II diabetics (as an example) to integrated chronic care programs designed to stave-off emergency room visits, loss of limbs, peripheral vascular disease, loss of vision, etc. while access to the latest imaging technology, interventional cardiac programs and surgery ranges from good to stellar and even drastically redundant in some markets.
Knowing the above and understanding that a fluid and flourishing economy has been built around this system, the belief or premise that one can design and make work effectively, a paradigm shift such as is intended with ACOs is curious at best. Suffice to say that while I know such a premise makes sense (Accountable Care Organizations), I’m less than certain from my read of the proposed regulations and knowledge of the current system, how incentive realignment will work to first, bend the “cost” curve and second, create a necessary body of invested, at-risk stakeholders willing to place their economic futures (such that they are) in the hands of a governmental half-and-half, moving payment system. Moreover, the initial investment capital is clearly all provider capital placed at first dollar risk and the shared-savings return proposed, provides a poor return on the capital invested. This is particularly true for the post-acute elements critical in the formation of a truly functional ACO.
For an ACO at is primordial core to work (achieve the desired outcomes), hospital utilization and the most expensive clinical utilization must be diminished. Diminution of such care is achieved primarily, via three methods/interventions/actions.
- Primary care available and accessible enough to create consistent early detection and provide low-cost interventions that arrest a progressing disease-state prior to an acute event that ordinarily would cause hospitalization. In the case of Type II diabetics for example, education and monitoring of insulin levels and Ha1c to create optimal therapy and patient knowledge and disease management efficacy that delays and avoids, hospitalization and interventions on a crisis basis. By simply deferring and/or avoiding, undetected and untreated peripheral leg and foot ulcers, thousands upon thousands of days of hospitalizations for amputations and/or intravenous therapy for infections can be avoided – annually.
- Delivering care in lower-cost settings or alternative settings, non-hospital based, nets enormous savings. As payment today is skewed toward hospitalization and hospital-based care, patients disproportionately receive care, tests, procedures in hospital settings. A primary example of how skewed the system has been is the artificial and unnecessary three-day prior hospital stay qualifier in order to receive Medicare coverage in a nursing home. Equally as non-sensical are the present Part B outpatient therapy caps for any non-hospital based and provided therapy. I could literally list hundreds of payment and care provision inequities but my point is made.
- True integration and data sharing among providers must occur and each provider must bear an incremental reward benefit and/or downside risk. If providers cannot access data fluidly on a patient population and share best practices encompassing steerage to the most cost-effective, best-outcome sources for care without fear of system reprisal, holes and gaps to effective care delivery at the best price/cost will remain too plentiful.
Taking the above into account, two major obstacles still remain in terms of successful development of an ACO. The first is patients, now indoctrinated into a system where pills, brands, certain tests, and other non-proven care modalities are expected, nay demanded. Simultaneous, this same group is famous for varying elements of non-compliance born out of a belief (though untrue) that most anything has a “medical fix” component. All the best practices and lower-cost alternative settings can’t overcome patient behavior unless and until, patients are part of the risk-benefit system.
The second obstacle, touched on earlier, is the system of reward or the model of risk-benefit. The ACO core model is one of risk-sharing; gains in the form of varying levels of saving returned to the providers willing to bear “risk” in the form of higher than desired utilization, costs, etc., or outcomes including satisfaction that are below certain pre-determined and desirable levels. The inherent fallacy within this concept is multifaceted to say the least.
- As indicated, patients are a true wild-card; both in terms of behavior and health status. As the patient remains effectively detached from the risk-benefit equation, behavior is left to chance. Additionally, health status going into the population on behalf of patients is effectively unknown. In short, a “ticking coronary time-bomb” may be present (or similarly present) creating a cost and outcome explosion that defeats the opportunity of an ACO to truly deliver effective savings. The inability in the present regulations to set a path for securitizing against this risk and for truly integrating patients into the risk-reward equation (some element of cost-share broader than present) makes the attainment of long-term savings at a significant level, illusory.
- For many providers (or perhaps all) the up-front investments in terms of technology and service accessibility are steep. This is dramatically so for post-acute providers as the Federal Government refuses to offer any resources for technology investment – not the case with physicians and hospitals. This is fundamentally illogical as a major element to delivering true savings is via the full use of alternative care settings – lower cost options for care such as therapy/rehabilitation, chronic disease clinics, etc. What occurs as a result of this enormous “up front” investment is a return on investment profile that is marginal to poor; in most cases (and in all that I have analyzed) below the organization’s cost of capital. Additionally, the prospective savings return is not fluid or rapid leaving providers with a self-funding equation of producing results, subsidization of investment and cash flow, netting a return that is below any other reasonable and readily available alternatives.
- The sharing of incentives is impractically aligned such that the largest sources of current costs stand to lose the most while the post-acute elements stand to gain the least, though as the above occurs, the distribution is far from quid-pro-quo. Briefly: ACOs begin fundamentally with physician groups and hospitals. To fully achieve functionality and to meet the objective of better care provided cheaper, other providers core to the care continuum must be brought into the ACO. Hospitals primarily have invested heavily in the current system of fee-for-service reimbursement, building environments that return the most on investment when heavily utilized on an in-patient and procedural basis. It is illogical to assume that for most hospitals, voluntarily steering utilization elsewhere to lower cost settings or abating certain levels of utilization altogether in exchange for “shared savings” spread across the ACO players is a winning proposition. On a similar plane, the same is true for physician specialists. Interventional cardiologists will be hard-pressed to forego any elements of business financially and in honest reflection, Medicare-age patients are a major (if not the primary) source of patients. For post-acute providers, utilization should likely increase as their services are more cost-effective but as established, these providers are bit players in the ACO game and while perhaps the most effective element in controlling costs and utilization, not proportionately rewarded. Their participation for example, is all down-streamed through the ACO.
Forming a post-acute synopsis of the current ACO landscape is as simple as this: Play at your own risk. There is little for most post-acute providers to gain within the present ACO framework, financially. All gains are more market and patient-flow related. The investments in terms of technology are steep and unsupported via government funding. Similarly, the net margin attainable via an ACO that is at “risk” or participating in shared savings is less than adequate to support a return on capital investment scenario that justifies the up-front costs. Personally, I would treat ACO participation at this stage as exploratory only; a devotion of only a small investment on-par and an expectation that minimal financial gain will occur, if any.
It stands to reason that some provider elements within the post-acute industry will stand to benefit better than others if for no other reason that they are already aligned from a business perspective to do so. LTACHs could reap significant market share if they can pose as legitimate first-admit options to an acute hospital. SNFs that are and have been, operating as true transitional care providers with in-house, integrated services could become major partner players within the ACO landscape. Key however to an SNF’s viability is some reform from three-day prior hospitalization requirements and relaxation/elimination of the Part B therapy caps. Home health agencies that already have an infrastructure for electronic charting, referrals and a strong physician partnerships and hospital referral/discharge relationships are the most logical post-acute, ACO partners. The ability of a home health agency to manage a more complicated patient directly discharged from a hospital as well as bring into the home, core chronic disease management services adjunct to physician care is an ACO necessity. As today and for the foreseeable future, ACO realization or not, Hospice will remain only a bit player, if that. While Hospice is an effective alternative to more costly inpatient care when continued inpatient care and/or other procedural steps are unwarranted, getting patients, their families/significant others, and the physician community in general to openly embrace Hospice early and frequently is not going to occur simply because of an ACO. Hospice, as I have written before, is a niche’ in the post-acute continuum and nothing within current trends suggest to me that the U.S. health system and patient expectations are moving to a deeper appreciation for or understanding of, the role hospice can and should play.
CMS, Proposed ACO Regulations and a Post-Acute Analysis
Late last week, CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) issued the proposed regulations for Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). As is typical with CMS and all things PPACA related, the document is nearly 500 pages. I have read and begun to digest (creating of course, indigestion) the entirety of the document. As I have prepared copious notes and questions more than answers, it will take me another day or so to formulate a coherent analysis, particularly as the information pertains to post-acute providers. Given my workload at the moment, I will endeavor to have a post up by Friday at the latest.
Hearing also from lots of sources continued questions on RUGs IV, questions regarding new hospice requirements, and of course, questions regarding the latest budget release from House Republicans and implications for Medicare, Medicaid, and the PPACA, I have more than a bunch to sift through and ultimately, post thoughts on and hopefully, some guidance. Suffice to say, these are interesting times for health care providers and the sands are shifting constantly. A significant shift toward a faster death for the PPACA will undoubtedly reform what we “think” we know today about ACOs, Medicaid and even Medicare. Stay tuned and feel free as many of you do, to drop me a note regarding a topic, your insights, or a question that I may be able to answer or steer you to an answer/resource.
MedPac Report to Congress: 2012 Recommendations
MedPac (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission) just released its March report to the Congress on Medicare program and rate recommendations for the FY 2012 (beginning October 1, 2011). The full report is available in PDF form on the Reports and Other Documents page on this site. Below I’ve provided a summary of the key recommendations contained in the report.
Important to note about this year’s report and the recommendations contained therein is the political context in which this report will be received. Congress has often been politically unmotivated to take MedPac’s recommendations fully to heart as the same often involves program and payment reform following a path of curtailed spending. As MedPac was officially created/established as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, a critical element of its charge is to monitor payment adequacy in light of Medicare’s beneficiary’s access to care and the quality of care delivered. Most notably, MedPac has gradually evolved to an organization that advocates for more aggressive programmatic reforms combined with rate reduction and/or spending reduction. For routine readers of the annual payment reports (issued in March), the opening tone within the Executive Summary section has grown more pointed regarding Medicare’s solvency issues (lack of sustainability) and the Commission’s view of Medicare and the broader economic impact it has on the global U.S. economy. Today (presently) within a House that is demonstrably pushing spending reforms and reductions and an overall Congressional environment stuck in debate regarding fiscal reforms that include entitlement reform, MedPac’s report certainly will receive more review and deliberation than in other years. Similarly, health care is a front burner issue given the politics (anti-reform) that surround the recently passed PPACA, effectively producing a wholesale shift in political power in Washington. Wrap the Washington political issues with a moribund economy that hasn’t yet established its recovery footing, significant Medicaid deficits across the States, and local political wars focused on labor unions, contracts and unfunded and/or expensive benefit packages (including health care). Summarized: The ancient Chinese proverb applies, “It is better to be a dog in a peaceful time than to be a man in a chaotic period”.
Opening, MedPac provides a quick context for their recommendations noting that Medicare’s share of the total GDP is expected to rise from 3.5% to 5.5% by 2035. More important and a point too often missed by economists and analysts is that Medicare’s cost growth is not separate from the larger health care economy as it is directly linked to other cost drivers within the health care system that today, are rising far faster than GDP growth (especially given the current and recent pace of GDP growth). Overall, including the payroll tax funded Part A, Medicare consumes 18 percent of all income tax revenue. The CMS Office of the Actuary, taking into account the purported Medicare spending reductions contained in the PPACA (see my last post on the Unraveling of the PPACA for more on Medicare and the PPACA) forecast a slower rate of spending growth – 6% vs. 9% under current law. Critical to this assumption is the realization of spending reductions totaling $575 billion as well as a more stabilized, normative GDP growth pattern combined with historic levels of employment.
Key to this year’s payment recommendations (FY 2012) is MedPac’s philosophy and charge of balancing equitable payments that maintain or improve access, redistribute payments within a particular PPS sector to improve equity among providers and/or adjust for biases in patient selection and service (the term “cherry picking” applies), correct unusual patterns of utilization (over incentivizing) and to attempt to tie payments to quality outcomes and efficient practices (pay-for-performance). The report covers 10 PPS sectors of which, I follow and work within 6 primarily. As a result, I won’t summarize or comment on MedPac’s recommendations for hospital inpatient, hospital outpatient, ambulatory surgery centers, and outpatient dialysis. Readers with interest in these sectors can download the report from my site page titled “Reports and Other Documents”.
- Physicians and Other Health Professional Services: MedPac dances through this topic without adding any substantive input regarding physician fees, let alone any other allied health professions with fees tied to the physician fee schedule (outpatient therapy for example). Primarily the avoidance is due to the political “hot potato” that is the SGR (Sustainable Growth Rate) issue. Per MedPac’s analysis, overall beneficiary access to physician care is good, physicians continue to accept Medicare patients, service volume continues to grow, quality is stable, and payments for service run at 80% of the typical PPO payment for similar care (unchanged from last year). MedPac does note however that some regional problems in terms of access to primary care are present, attributable to moderately low levels of reimbursement (in some cases, half as much as payments to specialists) and the inherent flaws of the SGR. MedPac comments on the need to reform this reimbursement mechanism but offers no insight into what it may propose, merely that projected fee cuts of 25% in 2012 are untenable and as a result, MedPac will continue to work on developing alternative SGR approaches along with other formulaic options for the fee-schedule. Their overall rate recommendation is a 1% increase in fee-schedule service related payments.
- Skilled Nursing Facilities: Per MedPac, Medicare spent $26.4 bilion on SNF reimbursement in 2010 and per their analysis, the majority of indicators examined showed payment adequacy. Prefacing their rate recommendations, the reports notes that the average Medicare margin for a free-standing SNF was 18% in 2009. Specifically, MedPac notes that facilities with wider Medicare margins have aggregated more days into higher paying PPS groups, particularly rehab focused groups as opposed to the medically complex groups. Additionally, provider costs remained relatively stable while rate increases paced above cost inflation. Per MedPac, successful facilities have found ways to have costs well below industry averages, high quality and corresponding high Medicare margins. As a result of these conclusions, MedPac is recommending no rate adjustment for SNFs for 2012 while recommending continued categorical revisions within the PPS to move payment focus away from rehab to clinical care – more focused on patient care needs. Additionally, they are recommending quality of care modifiers, providing incentives for high quality providers and creating rate reductions (disincentives) for sub-standard quality such as “avoidable” re-hospitalization. As required under the PPACA, MedPac is also charged with reporting on Medicaid utilization. Interestingly, their comments are boiled down substantially, indicating that total Medicaid certified beds have decreased while utilization and spending has increased. They note that Medicaid margins are negative and fundamentally, that all non-Medicare margins are negative but total margins for the industry are positive.
- Home Health Services: As it has in prior reports, MedPac continues to advise that access is adequate (90% of beneficiaries live within a zip code containing a certified agency), the number of agencies continues to grow dominated by for-profit entities within a limited geography, the volume of episodes of care continue to increase (25% over the period 2002 to 2009), quality measures are fundamentally unchanged from previous years, and the major for-profit organizations have sufficient access to capital. As in the most recent prior year reports, MedPac notes that the PPS system continues to produce high margins for providers (17%), principally because payments exceed costs and growth in cost per episode remains below the assumptions used in the market basket update. Using these conclusions combined with a cautionary statement regarding discovered fraud in the industry, MedPac recommends that the Secretary be charged with re-basing home health rates over a two year period, starting in 2013 (October of 2012). Re-basing of rates would target a reduction in the therapy “incentive”, modulating more rate toward medical care while incorporating a revised case-mix system. Additionally, MedPac recommends the development of a cost-share for home health, thereby instituting a beneficiary payment for services. MedPac believes, like in other Medicare post-acute payments, that imposition of a cost-share will charge the beneficiary with more consumer awareness of the benefit and the utilization thereof. Finally, MedPac recommends that the Secretary charge the Office of Inspector General with enforcement responsibility in areas/regions where fraud has been evident, removing payments, reducing enrollment and de-certifying agencies engaged in fraudulent activity.
- Inpatient Rehab Facilities: Although a relatively small segment in the post-acute continuum ($6 billion), MedPac is recommending a zero percent increase in IRF rates. They conclude that access is adequate, quality as supported by improvement at discharge is stable to improving, and as most facilities are hospital based, access to capital is not an issue. They note that the average margin for IRFs is 8.4%.
- Long-term Care Hospitals (LTACH): As with IRFs, this segment is relatively small – $4.9 billion. MedPac notes that in spite of the limited moratorium placed on new LTACH and additional beds in existing facilities (July 07 to December 2012), the number of facilities increased by 6.6%; worked through the exceptions provided within the moratorium. LTACHs are not required to submit quality data to CMS though MedPac reports, based on claim reviews, that readmissions and deaths within 30 days of discharge are stable or marginally declining compared to prior years. Per MedPac, payments between 2008 and 2009 increased 6.4% despite costs increases of 2%. The average Medicare margin in 2009 was 5.7%. Within the PPACA, LTACHs are subject by 2014 to a pay-for-reporting program, though “reporting of what” is yet defined. MedPac also believes that a pay-for-performance element should be introduced. The recommendation for a rate increase or update for 2012 is zero.
- Hospice: Per MedPac, hospice services received $12 billion in Medicare reimbursement 2009. In the same year, hospice use increased across virtually all demographic areas and across beneficiary characteristics. Between 2000 and 2009, the supply of hospices increased by 50% with for-profit organizations accounting for virtually the entire amount of growth. During the same period (2000-2009), the use of hospice increased from 23% of all decedents to 42% of all decedents with average length of stay increasing from 54 days to 86 days. In 2012, CMS is required to publish quality measures and in 2014, hospices are required to report on these quality measures or receive a 2 percentage point reduction in payment. For 2012, MedPac recommends a 1% rate update. As in previous reports, MedPac recommends that the hospice PPS be altered to create higher payments for days early in the stay and late (near death) in the stay with lower payments applicable during the middle of the stay. As stays continue to move slightly longer, this payment system is supposed to reflect more accurately, the intensity and cost of services provided to the typical hospice patient. MedPac also recommends that the Secretary of HHS investigate the relationships between hospices and nursing homes and the differences in patterns of referrals between nursing homes and hospices. MedPac also calls for an investigation into agency enrollment practices where lengths of stay are unusually long as well as an investigation into the marketing and referral development practices of these agencies, particularly as they pertain to length of stay. This recommendation is unchanged from last year.
The Unraveling of the PPACA
OK readers and requesters, I haven’t gone, as Robert Frost wrote, into the “woods lovely, dark and deep” but I have been preoccupied by work and things familial. Sadly, energy wanes as one focuses intently on the delicate balance that is juggling a frenetic work schedule, a mile of other professional commitments, travel, and family. Returning slowly to regularity in life will allow me to re-connect and be once again, more “informationally” fluid.
A major emphasis of my work has been translating health policy into actionable strategies for clients. Some efforts are rather profound and deep and others are rather functional and tactile. The latter was the case with the Medicare RUGs III, MDS 3.0, RUGs Hybrid, RUGs IV debacle, partially created by the PPACA and partially due to the lack of foresight on the part of Congress. In the end, this mess evolved to where it should have been all along – a grouper and an assessment tool that actually matched. Today, we are simply left gazing forward at what might be once CMS figures out how the RUGs IV payments are flowing and whether providers are using the system correctly. I fully expect CMS, as they historically have, to go through a series of gyrations to fine tune the payment categories, equating the new system to that which was originally intended – something that is expense neutral (or close to) for the Medicare program. History being what it is (a reasonably good predictor of future behavior), we saw and lived through a similar dance with previous PPS system versions.
Turning to the title of this post and topically, a question(s) I am asked all too often: What can we expect or not expect to happen next under the current phase-in process of the PPACA? Following the law as written would provide an answer but clearly, the law as written is unraveling as we move seemingly, day by day. Consider the following events of recent weeks/months.
- A power-shift in Congress overloaded the House with Republicans and structurally, fiscal conservatives that swept into the majority on a platform of “anti-health care reform and anti-deficit spending”. As the House fundamentally controls the majority of appropriations and budget policy, funding barriers to continue the roll-out of the PPACA are certain.
- Over 1,000 waivers to certain elements of the PPACA have been granted, with more forthcoming, principally targeted at giving insurers, major corporations (multi-state businesses) and recently, labor unions relief from the mandated coverage limits imposed under the law. Secondarily, states have sought relief from various Medicaid provisions that came part and parcel with the enhanced FMAP provided under the Stimulus bill (corollary to additional elements required under th PPACA). From some vantage points, Medicaid may be the 10 ton gorilla in the room when all is said and done regarding the future of the PPACA.
- A series of court cases and resulting decisions have established the framework of a constitutional challenge to the law. Opinions/decisions affirming constitutionality were rendered by Democratic judicial appointees and opinions/decisions affirming unconstitutionally rendered by Republican judicial appointees. Clearly, the matter of constitutionality of the key requirement of universal insurance purchase/participation for every American will be settled only by the Supreme Court. The remaining question is “when”. If the key provision of universal (everyone must) purchase/participation is found unconstitutional, the PPACA is functionally dead.
- Within the past week or so, Secretary Sebelius of HHS publicly went on the “record” in Congressional committee testimony that the financing of the PPACA included effective double-use (double counting) of the projected $500 billion in Medicare savings that is projected within the law. This, while newsworthy, is not news to anyone who read the CBO scoring, read earlier testimony from Medicare’s Chief Actuary, or fundamentally, could follow basic arithmetic logic and principles. The Medicare savings argument was flawed when first proffered on so many levels. First, the savings was phantom money in so much that it required Congress to sustain actual rate cuts while relying on finding and stopping “fraud and abuse” thereby creating savings. If in fact, the fraud and abuse savings were or are known, a 2,000 page piece of legislation surely wasn’t necessary to end the fraudulent and abusive practices (the same being already illegal) and render the savings. Similarly, Congress has no known history of sustaining meaningful spending controls on entitlements, particularly Medicare. Finally, the physician fee-schedule fix was never incorporated into the PPACA or its financial projections regarding Medicare spending – this tally alone evaporates all if not the majority of the projected savings. Suffice to say, in order to net $500 billion in Medicare savings as foretold by the PPACA and its proponents, a perfect storm unlike any ever seen in Washington would need to occur, not to mention a real current spending reduction of close to $900 billion (adding in the Medicare physician fee schedule “fix” costs of approximately $400 billion as unaccounted spending, netted against the savings to achieve a net savings of $500 billion). For those who would argue that the physician fee schedule fix won’t cost $400 billion, I humbly reply “do the math”. Congress continues to avoid this issue in real time by creating temporary patches as the real numbers inclusive of a formulaic change in the law (change away from the sustainable growth algorithm) that prevents significant fee schedule cuts for physicians will require approximately $300 billion in “new” spending. Add another $100 billion or so for the programs such as outpatient therapies that are tied to the fee schedule and $400 billion is conservatively, a solid figure. The double-counting occurs as a result of creating the phony $500 billion and using the “dollars” to create new benefits and expanded eligibility levels and programs within the PPACA (primarily Medicaid expansion). The costs of these new benefits greatly exceeds $500 billion in reality and thus, no savings will occur.
- President Obama during a speech at the National Governor’s Association publicly announced his willingness to offer states greater flexibility and an accelerated date to file alternative plans to meet the PPACA requirements pertaining to exchanges and Medicaid expansion. In effect, President Obama stated that the law was still a “work in progress” and states could devise their own alternatives, provided the alternatives were as comprehensive and provided the same level of benefits as required under the PPACA. Until this revelation, states were operating under the premise that PPACA requirements dictating how Medicaid expansion would work, the exchange plan mandates for coverages, etc. were immovable objects, at least until 2014 by when, each state would have incurred enormous costs associated with implementation. The conclusion: More unraveling about to occur.
- Arizona became the first state in what promises to be a growing list, to apply to the federal government for a waiver allowing 300,000 people to be removed from its Medicaid program (disenrolled). Arizona, like multiple states, saw its Medicaid enrollment explode due to the economic recession and provisions within the Stimulus Bill which provided enhanced Medicaid matches conditioned upon the creation of certain new programs of benefits and coverages under Medicaid. The “rub” today is the sunset date of June 30 which ends the enhanced Medicaid funding. By law, the money goes away but the programs and benefits it funded must be maintained by the state; hence, the need for a waiver. The evaporating Medicaid enhancement exposes the enormity of state Medicaid and other budget deficits – in Arizona, $1.1 billion total deficit and potential savings of $541 million if the waiver is granted (fully half of the state’s deficit). From a PPACA perspective, the next move in Washington regarding a request such as that from Arizona will be fascinating. A core element within reform used to achieve the coverage objectives is an expansion of Medicaid. A waiver granted to Arizona is a virtual submission on the part of Washington that state Medicaid plans and budgets are incapable of meeting the financial requirements concurrent with expansion, absent significant cash infusions from Washington (not wholly provided with the PPACA). For those of us who closely follow health policy, we’ve warned loudly and frequently that Medicaid as presently configured, is the worst vehicle to use to expand coverage. The PPACA did nothing to alter the maniacal constructs of Medicaid, its funding, and its bureaucratic programmatic tenets. It further did nothing to allocate sufficient resources to the states to support expansion thus leaving states to bear an enormous primarily unfunded mandate within their existing and growing, bankrupt Medicaid programs. Aside from a Supreme Court ruling finding the PPACA universal participation/purchase requirements unconstitutional, the Medicaid issues are a strong and close second that could cause the PPACA to completely unravel.
The above notwithstanding, the PPACA gives us a glimpse into the future of health policy and ultimately, health care financing and delivery in the U.S. Regardless of whether the law survives in whole or in part, certain elements I believe, are new realities and I have counseled clients to begin to plan accordingly.
- Money is an issue and the goal of the PPACA while inherently flawed in the form finished, was to slow the growth of entitlement spending and “bend the cost curve”. This need or goal is pressing for the U.S. as entitlement spending cannot be sustained at is present level. This simply means that Medicare and Medicaid are fundamentally and completely exhausted (financially and programmatically). Regardless of form and resultant policy, reimbursement levels will remain fundamentally flat to trending down – no other way for them to go unless new tax revenues are allocated to each program (not feasible). Kicking the issue down the road as Washington and states have done is no longer an option as the “road” has ended or its end is clearly in sight. The best providers can hope for is flat reimbursement with a recognition on the part of legislators that greater flexibility from overbearing regulations is needed to help offset the revenue loss (if I can’t pay you more I can at least make it cheaper for you to operate).
- Greater emphasis will be placed on finding and eliminating waste and fraud – already happening but ramped up to an even higher level. Realize that Medicaid and Medicare are self-wasting disasters by design in terms of how modern health care is delivered and financed but vigilance and enforcement is feel-good activity; results often are minimal in comparison to costs to obtain the results. Providers thus will contend with more questions, more rules for disclosure, more reporting, more probes and more audits. Clearly, the costs borne by providers to monitor and justify their billing practices to Medicare and Medicaid will rise.
- Infrastructure investments in terms of technology will rise as providers will need to justify more directly, their care vs. their bills. Simultaneous (or at least proximal), PPACA provisions and other federal provisions regarding privacy, electronic billing, health information exchanges, etc., will not evaporate entirely. Providers will need to be able to communicate across functions and across related and unrelated provider organizations, patient information, quality measures, and care information (treatments plans, history, orders, etc.).
- Terms and concepts brought forth under the PPACA such as Accountable Care Organizations, Competitive Bidding and Bundled Payments are here to stay, regardless of the life or death of the PPACA. They make too much sense intuitively even if the same translates poorly in federal policy. Organizations that take the “conceptual elements and goals” of things like Accountable Care Organizations and begin to develop programs and structural changes in “how” they do business will be far better off than those who believe that these concepts will die as the PPACA continues to unravel. A future where reimbursement is more closely tied to outcomes and penalties for events such as avoidable re-hospitalization, repeat hospitalizations, avoidable institutional infections, etc. is virtually certain.
- A renewed focus on primary and community based medical care, prevention, and chronic care management is forthcoming – soon. Philosophically, although wrongly implemented and structured, the PPACA was Washington’s politicized attempt to create this focus. There is solid logic behind such a focus as diminution in each of these areas (or in some cases, failure to fully launch) directly correlate to rapidly rising health costs (and correspondingly high rates of expensive, preventable chronic illness such as diabetes, obesity, heart disease, etc.). Even Washington knows that ultimately, funding and enhanced payment for better primary, community and chronic disease care is necessary and smart. The problem is, as has always been the case with policy elements measured in the billions or trillions of expenditures, politics gets in the way of functionality – hence the PPACA.
RUGs IV Here to Stay!
The news we all hoped for came forth this afternoon, wrapped with a big bow just in time for the Holiday season – RUGs IV is here to stay. The House this afternoon passed a companion version of the bill passed in the Senate yesterday. President Obama is expected to sign the bill into law shortly.
The legislation calls for $19.2 billion in appropriations to make RUGs IV effective retroactively to October 1, 2010. In addition, the legislation extends the Medicare Part B therapy cap exception provision presently in place, until the end of 2011. Without such an extension to the exception process, the Part B therapy caps were set to be automatically reinstated with no exception on January 1, 2011. As part of the extension of therapy cap exception process, the legislation also staves off pending cuts of approximately 25% in Medicare payments to physicians required by the current sustainable growth formula which drives the physician fee schedule (and related Part B services such as outpatient therapies) under Part B. Without such a correction to the physician fee schedule, physician fees were set for the significant reduction on December 18 (Congress had already moved the date back to the 18th from the 1st of December).
The implementation of RUGs IV back to October 1 solves significant headaches for SNFs and CMS. As difficult as it has been for providers to get up to speed on MDS 3.0 and RUGs IV, the process was significantly complicated by the unknown of how the planned RUGs Hybrid would work and whether CMS would seek to recoup potential overpayments from providers as a result of RUGs IV being used temporarily. Many providers sought to establish liability accounts on their balance sheets for just such an event, even though estimating the liability was somewhat complex due to the lack of solid information regarding the Hybrid groups coming from CMS.
Having spoken to a number of people within CMS, the implementation of RUGs IV back to October 1 is a true gift. There were consistent difficulties in getting the Hybrid grouper to function in conjunction with MDS 3.0 and as such, a growing number of inquiries from the industry bombarded the agency expecting more information. Even more troubling was the prospect of having to deal with payment recapture; a procedural boondoggle CMS was hoping to avoid. In the end, I am confident that a number of people at CMS are rejoicing this evening.
On a final note, I wish to offer my personal congratulations to my industry colleagues and the trade associations who lobbied for this victory and to my readers, clients and business partners who required that I kept them informed and in many cases, helped me with additional information and of course, thoughtful inquiries that made me stay on top of this important issue. This policy victory was long overdue but as the saying goes, “better late than never”.
MDS 3.0, RUGs IV, RUGs III, Hybrid: A 45 Day Review
Forty- five days past the October 1 conversion to MDS 3.0 and the interim RUGS IV payment groups and I still am getting a great deal of requests for analysis tools, questions on payments, liabilities, dates and rates for the Hybrid (RUGs III) groups, maps between RUGs III and RUGs IV, etc. While I lost track of how many spreadsheets I have e-mailed and how many questions I’ve tried to answer, I have managed to keep track thematically of the issues and ongoing needs of the folks that contact me. To that end, it seems appropriate to consolidate the information I have, the questions I’ve gotten (and continue to get) and the issues as I hear them and provide my readers, colleagues and clients with a forty-five day recap. Many thanks to Brett Seekins at Baker Newman Noyes who has passed along his insights based on ongoing conversations with principals at CMS.
RUGs III Hybrid
As of today, the Hybrid grouper is still not functional and CMS states that it is still undergoing development and testing. I have confirmed this from numerous sources and CMS still is providing no hard date or date range when the Hybrid grouper may be functional. Per a contact that Brett Seekins from Baker Newman has at CMS, a crosswalk between RUGs III and RUGs III Hybrid was supposed to be posted on the CMS SNF web page by today. As of now, it is still not posted but when it does become available, I will get it, analyze it and make it available to anyone who requests it. NOTE: There is no crosswalk document between RUGs IV and RUGs Hybrid although there is a crosswalk between RUGs III and RUGs IV which I have and continue to make available to anyone who requests it. Based on what I see when I gain access to the RUGs III to Hybrid crosswalk, I may be able to make some sense of a crosswalk strategy between RUGs IV and Hybrid.
Retroactive Adjustments/Overpayment Collections
This is a hot topic and one that remains very much in limbo. First, CMS has made no definitive statements on how and if, repayments or retroactive adjustments will be handled when the switch is ultimately made between RUGs IV and Hybrid. Recall that when MDS 3.0 went into effect on October 1, RUGs IV was the only grouper system that worked with 3.0 and thus, is being used to pay providers. The issue that remains is for CMS to construct the Hybrid grouper and then, to determine how and if, overpayments occurred in the interim while RUGs IV was used. The “how” and “if” determination will drive what CMS does with respect to retroactive adjustments or recoupment of overpayments. My take on this subject is that CMS is a bit politically stuck at the moment as it, like the provider side of the business, is waiting to see if Congress steps forward and retroactively implements RUGs IV as law effective October 1, 2010. This step would be huge and eliminate a ton of complications. As to how likely this is, my guess is a shade better than 50/50. Despite the present “lame-duck” session where historically, little of great significance is accomplished legislatively, a Medicare ticking time bomb exists. This time bomb has to do with the pending cuts to the physician fee schedule, an issue I wrote extensively about in late spring and early summer. Recall, that Congress created a temporary series of patches, the last creating a modest increase in the fee schedule (and related Part B services such as rehabilitation therapies) while pushing the scheduled cuts back to November 30. The cuts are a result of a law passed by Congress years ago tying the increase or decrease in physician fees (and related Part B services) to a sustainable growth formula or more simple, a formula that is based on economic growth and overall program spending in Medicare. Due to a languishing economy, the formula in-place calls for cuts in physician fees by 21% in 2010 with another forecast for additional cuts in 2011 (the current fiscal year).
Considering the physician fee schedule issue, Congress now must address this problem or face an enormous potential crisis with physicians and other providers reducing their services to Medicare beneficiaries. The good news here for RUGs IV is that legislation regarding Medicare will be drafted if for no other significant purpose than to address the fee schedule problems, leaving room for other program changes to slip in such as those involving the implementation of RUGs IV. In any other lame-duck session scenario, I would say that the chances of the RUGs IV issue being addressed would be “slim and none”.
On a final note, CMS has their hands full with getting the hybrid system in-place and therefore, retroactive adjustments are a far distant priority. Remember, RUGs III and RUGs IV are pegged at budget neutral or in other words, RUGs IV is not supposed to cost Medicare any more dollars than the cumulative outlays under RUGs III. In reality, because of the complexities of the new MDS assessment and the resultant changes to the case-mix weights that drive payments under RUGs IV, I believe CMS will spend less money initially under a RUGs IV system. It will take providers a year or two to learn the intricacies of the new system and to adjust their operations, coding and billing practices accordingly. This means that CMS will be under minimal pressure to recoup overpayments as few will likely exist. I believe a greater probability is that CMS will make a technical adjustment in their annual rate setting for SNFs in July/August next year, reducing potential increases by a small factor for overpayments during the transition period. Again, this only occurs if Congress fails to address the implementation date of RUGs IV back to October 1, 2010.
Establishing a Liability for Overpayments
Given the above discussion on retroactive adjustments, I have advised providers to prudently establish a liability for overpayment based on their Medicare utilization since October 1. Here is what I am advising people to do regarding this transition and hybrid period. First, obtain a calculator with RUGs III hybrid rates and use it to establish a liability on the balance sheet for overpayments. The calculator allows you to enter your utilization by RUGs III and/or RUGs IV claims and produces results for each payment system. I have a calculator tool that I make available. Second, run a month end manual test on your claims by using the published hybrid rates. CMS released these in August. The manual test is as easy as a quick sample of claims for the month, mapped against the hybrid categories. Where a hybrid category does not exist, use the RUGs IV category – CMS has said it will use RUGs IV categories where no RUGs III hybrid exists. Third, compare your results and adjust your liability up or down by the error percentage (how much your sample said you were over or under) for the next month and error on the side of being conservative. If in fact, Congress acts or CMS chooses not to recoup payments from individual providers, the liability simply evaporates to income once the issue is resolved. The sole side-effect temporarily, is that income is slightly understated by the effect of the liability.
Monitor Performance and Progress
Regardless of where an SNF feels it is on the journey post October 1, the number of questions I am still getting plus the number of tools that I still send out suggest that providers are still transitioning. This is to be expected given the enormity of change and the ordinary bumps in the road caused by CMS and its intermediaries. My advice is that SNFs check their progress on the transition by doing the following.
- For any SNF that is using a therapy contractor or rehab company, audit your contractor/rehab company. The largest change that occurred under the switch to MDS 3.0 and ultimately RUGs IV is in the provision of and payment for therapy. Recall that the therapy company is not the Medicare Part A provider; the SNF is. Any liabilities that arise from billing problems, overpayments, etc. are ultimately the responsibility of the provider with the agreement with CMS or in other words, the SNF. I have seen tons of therapy company contracts with very limited indemnity clauses, typically not worth much in the event of a major billing probe, upcoding issues, fraud investigations or recoupment of overpayments. In virtually all of these clauses, the indemnification back to the SNF from the therapy company is for the cost of the therapy charged by the therapy company to the SNF; not for the lost revenue and/or fines and penalties that can occur. It is the SNF’s responsibility to assure that Medicare is appropriately billed and care is correctly provided and documented as assessed on the MDS. The simplest way for an SNF to assure that such is the case is to audit the therapy company’s performance. I have an outstanding partnership relationship with a therapy management firm (not a therapy company) that can provide such a service, cost-effectively and efficiently. The principals are all MDS 3.0 certified and have decades of experience as therapists in the long-term care industry. I advise any SNF that hasn’t audited their therapy provider to do so ASAP. Even for SNFs that provide their therapies via employees, it makes sense to have an expert come-in, review current practices and to provide guidance where improvements can be made. Feel free to contact me for a referral.
- Periodically, check your utilization patterns as occurred under RUGs III and now, under RUGs IV. Use a crosswalk tool to see exactly how your claims under RUGs IV are trending compared to what they were under RUGs III. In 45 days, a significant change should not occur as for most providers, case-mix evolves rather slowly. If you are seeing big jumps or changes, something is amiss (for example, Ultra High rehab patients should still conform accordingly under the RUGs III method and then group accordingly under RUGs IV).
- Monitor your MDS completions and the time it is taking to complete the assessment. MDS 3.0 is heavily driven by interviews and accordingly, a provider should see a shift in time taken with direct patient interviews. Likewise, the ultimate shift under RUGs IV significantly changes therapy minute counting, especially concerning concurrent therapy. Provider should see movements toward more individualized therapy time and elimination of look-back assessments.
- Sample some new admissions looking for a match between clinical charting and MDS coding. What is being coded on the MDS should correlate tightly with what is reflected in the resident clinical record. If there is a gap, time for re-training.
Tools
I have a number of tools that I can forward to make the analysis, budgeting, forecasting, checking, etc. easier. For example, I have current Hybrid rates, RUGs IV rates by region/location, a RUGs III, Hybrid and RUGs IV calculator by region/location, a RUGs III to RUGs IV crosswalk and hopefully soon, a RUGs III to Hybrid crosswalk. Feel free to e-mail me and request any or all of these tools or comment to this post with a valid e-mail address and I will get them to you ASAP. My e-mail is Hislop3@msn.com. Likewise, feel free to drop me a question and I will do the best I can to answer it or point you in the right direction.
As the Home Health and Hospice World Turns: Part II
In Part I, I wrote about my last week’s conversations, etc. regarding the home health industry, specifically Amedysis, the Senate Finance Committee inquiry, the industry impact via the PPACA and the likely consolidation and merger trends that are approaching. Suffice to say, not all of last week’s news and conversations focused on the home health industry as over the last thirty days, much has happened in the hospice industry as well. The difference between the two industries is that in hospice, the major news involved a significant merger and in home health, the major news involved the legal and compliance issues of the largest provider entity – Amedysis.
The hospice industry saw, via the merger between Gentiva and Odyssey, the creation of the largest home hospice company in the industry. Gentiva, while also a provider of home health, clearly chose to direct more of its attention to the hospice industry, moving from a moderate player in the industry to the predominant player via the acquisition of Odyssey. Odyssey, while not as large as Vitas (the former largest hospice provider), held substantial market share and presence and in many regions and distinct market areas, competed head to head with Vitas for patients. For more information on the Gentiva/Odyssey transaction, see a related article in my company’s E-Newsletter at http://wp.me/pD9Ac-4Q .
Analyzing this merger leads me to a series of assumptions about where the hospice industry is at present and where it is likely headed.
- Hospice is now clearly a mature market or in other words, a market that is unlikely to grow significantly over the near to intermediate term horizon. Despite a fairly profound demographic shift occurring over the next twenty to thirty years (the maturation of the baby-boomers), there is no real indication even with this influx of older adults, that hospice as model of care, will gain in referral popularity. While seniors utilize hospice more in total numbers than any other age cohort, as a percentage of the total cohort, utilization trends show little forward growth. There are a number of reasons why;
- Culturally, U.S. medicine and the U.S. population still values the process of cure or health restoration far greater than the concept of natural death. As hospice is a downstream referral (the referral comes typically from non-palliative medicine trained physicians or via hospitals and/or long-term care providers), the hospice industry relies on the referral source to be; a) knowledgeable about the value of hospice and how it works for patients and their families, b) willing to forego potential incremental revenue for continued care by making the referral to a hospice, c) willing to engage the patient and the family in a difficult conversation regarding end-of-life and treatment futility. As long as these dynamics remain in place to the extent they presently are, the growth of utilization will remain fairly stagnant.
- Financially, the incentives for referrals to hospice don’t truly exist within the current U.S. system. There are no barriers in-place to reduce the reward (payment) for continued acute, diagnostic or curative care (choose your own verbiage) and as a matter of fact, the reimbursement systems (private and public) pay incrementally more for more intense care than palliative care, even if arguably, the care is futile. As only patients and their respective treating health professionals can conclude that continued curative care is futile or unreasonable, the process of garnering more money for more treatment remains intact as a perverse incentive.
- While not for hospice people or physicians trained in palliative medicine, terminality remains an uncomfortable and even disputed condition for many physicians. Patients and there families still wish to avoid discussions far too long and in some cases, avoid the discussion altogether. While in-roads are perhaps being made in some medical centers and in certain communities, these in-roads are miniscule and not evident of a ground-swell movement toward open discussions regarding end-of-life decisions.
- As with the home health industry, the movement in Washington is toward curtailing the growth of hospice spending. The prevailing feeling in Washington policy arenas, supported by Medpac, is that the hospice reimbursement under Medicare is too generous and the benefit itself, easily manipulated and poorly defined. While the PPACA did little to negatively impact the hospice benefit or payment, the recommendations directed to the Secretary of HHS in the language intones significant changes forthcoming.
- Reimbursement under Medicare will change such that early days in the initial benefit period will be paid more as will days at the end of the patient’s stay (proximal to death). Days during the interim, longer stays will be reimbursed with lower payments. The point here is supposedly a recognition that patients with long stays have periods of stability necessitating far less care from the hospice.
- More emphasis will be placed on denying stays for non-specific terminal conditions or denying portions of stays. CMS has determined that too many longer stays are related to diagnoses such as terminal dementia, failure to thrive, etc. In order for these stays to be covered, the onus will fall on the hospice to provide very detailed documentation supporting patient decline.
- More emphasis will be placed on physicians to document terminal conditions and to prognosticate length of likely survival, especially at recertification periods. More direct “hands-on” involvement of physicians will also be required (physically seeing the patient).
- Certain types of stays and relationships between hospices and nursing homes will be closely monitored and reviewed. CMS and Medpac have determined that hospice stays in nursing home environments on behalf of nursing home patients are considerably longer and possibly in many cases, in violation (the hospice) of the conditions of participation as hospices utilize nursing home residents as sources of revenue but often, fail to meet the care requirements (using the nursing home as the source of care and service) under the hospice federal code. Additionally, CMS and Medpac have placed the target for reform squarely on the large for-profit hospices such as Vitas, Gentiva and Odyssey which have typically used nursing homes as major sources of referrals for hospice patients.
- The PPACA, while not bending the cost curve or reducing the overall level of national expenditures on health care, does change in the interim, the overall health care economy. Providers are re-positioning and re-grouping to combat what they perceive, and in some cases know, will be negative changes to how they presently do business. Providers which rely heaviest on Medicare as the bulk of their overall revenues will move the fastest and the most aggressively to alter their current business practices, knowing that regardless of the overall status of the PPACA (repeal, restore Medicare cuts, etc.), the health care economy is entering a long period of fiscal constraint – payments will never be as high or as fluid as they once were.
- Because of points 1, 2 and 3 above, the industry will head into a period of consolidation and even, contraction. The Gentiva/Odyssey merger is a signal of the maturity of the industry and the trend toward tighter regulation of hospice stays under Medicare (the bulk of the hospice revenue) and less economic value per each stay. Lower future revenues per stay, either via reimbursement cuts or regulatory constraints placed on the length of stay, means more overall stays are required to equal the same or greater revenues going forward. As the growth curve of new “potential” referrals is flat, the only real source of new business or referrals for a provider is acquisition of existing market share (buying someone else’s referrals). In order to maximize profitability in an environment where the market is mature and the total revenue per each case is flat to shrinking, providers will have to adopt one of the three strategies below.
- Acquire other providers to build more referrals or volume. While each patient stay will be economically less valuable, increasing the total number for a provider while maintaining expenses on a ratio basis, lower than revenue, will provide a method to achieving overall net income targets - critical for publicly traded provider organizations.
- Shrink the organization to fit the new revenue and length of stay realities that are in place and forthcoming. An organization that can right-size its operations to fit the new business paradigm will be smaller but potentially equally or perhaps, more profitable. The risk here is that provider organizations that are acquiring market share may marginalize some markets such that a shrinking provider (by choice) loses desirable market share.
- Expand non-Medicare business and add complementary businesses that may provide incrementally equal or more revenue than that which is lost under Medicare. Arguably, this strategy may only work for regional or single market providers and those that have strong system ties (hospital owned, etc.).
One final point to note concerns the economy. Absent from the above factors I laid out influencing the hospice industry is the stagnant economy. With recovery a daily discussion regarding likelihood and timing, current uncertainties persist that impact hospice providers rather dramatically.
- The overall number of paying patients available to all providers within the health care economy has shrunk in recent years. This shrinkage is primarily due to job losses and benefit losses. Until employment rebounds and jobs with benefits become more plentiful, consumers for health care in the form of paying patients will remain down.
- When fewer paying patients are in the queue, those patients that do have a payer source, even a less than optimal government payer source, are prized commodities. Each provider wants a piece of the same paying patient.
- Hospice is as I pointed out, a downstream referral. When the upstream referral source, principally hospitals, lacks sufficient paying patients in the queue to replace current patients it “may” customarily refer downstream, it holds the paying patient longer, either delaying the referral and the portion of revenue that comes with a longer stay or avoiding the referral all-together. Similarly, all downstream referral sources such as nursing homes compete aggressively for the referrals even though a referral of a terminal patient (or potentially terminal patient) is ordinarily, not a prize catch for most nursing homes. This competition erodes the number of total possible referrals available to a hospice.
- Each patient has an economic value to a provider. When a patient with a higher economic value (a better payer source) are lacking, providers sort down to the next patient level. This sorting process occurs as a result of too few patients with payment sources available to match the supply or capacity within the existing provider universe. Some markets hit hardest by the downturn will evidence this reality in greater depth and unfortunately, with greater persistency. For hospices (and all downstream providers) in these heaviest hit markets, referrals have trended down and will stay down until the supply of patients with payment sources increases and specifically, the supply of patients with better payment sources and today, deferred health care needs (e.g., elective surgeries such as joint replacements, etc.).
As the Home Health and Hospice World Turns: Part I
Sorry for borrowing (piece of) a soap opera title for this post but it is rather appropriate given the news that occurred over the past 30 days. Just this past week, I’ve been interviewed by two business newspapers and on the phone with an investment banking firm I consult with from time to time regarding Amedysis, Gentiva and Odyssey’s merger, the pending impacts of the PPACA on the home health and hospice industry, mergers in the industry in general and using a “catch-all”, what the “heck” is going on in the home health and hospice sectors. With a chance to recoup over the long 4th of July weekend (and organize my notes from last week’s conversations), a post on what all the conversations were about seemed appropriate.
Amedysis: A month ago, on my company’s E-News site (http://apexhealthcareconsultants.info), I edited an article regarding the Senate Finance Committee’s inquiry into the Medicare billing practices of a handful of very large home health agencies (Amedysis, Gentiva, LHC Group etc.). The inquiry is a result of an article that appeared earlier in the year in the Wall Street Journal, focused quite intently on Amedysis’ billing practices; principally as applicable to therapy visits. The fall-out since the Wall Street Journal article and the Senate Finance Committee article is two-fold. First, the class action suit (I’ll touch on it in a bit) and the hefty drop in Amedysis stock price.
In brief, the class-action suits (there are three) focus primarily on the perspective of shareholders (the “class”) and alleges that the questionable Medicare billing practices (none of which at this point, CMS or the OIG has taken specific issue with) served to artificially increase the share price of Amedysis stock. The allegation of abuse of the Medicare system, prior to any action taken by the federal regulatory system in the form of a fraudulent billing investigation or claims investigation, is a bit different in-so-much that it essentially accuses the company of manipulating its earnings as opposed to causing harm to any patients or group (class) of patients. The “harm” for shareholders is the drop in price that would/did occur as a result of the alleged fraudulent billing practices. To add a twist, the suits also allege Sarbanes-Oxley violations which require the corporate officers of publicly traded companies to abide by a code of ethics. Amedysis settled an allegation of fraudulent Medicare billing practices in 2003 (for Medicare activity between 1994 and 1999) and as part of the settlement, expanded its corporate compliance activity/program. Additionally, since 2003, Amedysis has had notable turnover of the key financial executives (CFOs primarily) with active rumor-mill chatter focusing on the cause related to overly-aggressive Medicare billing practices. Medicare represents 87% of Amedysis annual revenues, by far the largest percentage for any home health provider in the industry.
As Paul Harvey (famous radio newsman now deceased) was famous for; “Now, for the rest of the story”. There are a number of different and integral factors in play that are unique to Amedysis but also, symptoms of an industry, a payment system and a flawed health care reform law.
- The issues regarding possible Medicare over-billing or at least, aggressive billing are not new for Amedysis. Their growth has been remarkable and unique for an agency so fully immersed in a government revenue stream. What is unique at this point in time is that the Senate Finance Committee inquiry, Wall Street Journal article and now the class-action suits come in advance of any customary federal regulatory actions. I do suspect that CMS and the OIG will enter the fray in the near future.
- Medpac has reported to Congress repeatedly that the Medicare payments to home health agencies were “lavish”, producing double digit profit margins on average, for most Medicare home health encounters. The PPACA (reform law) effectively cut Medicare payments to home health agencies and increased the documentation requirements for agencies to justify the necessity of continued visits.
- The feds have aggressively stepped-up their search via Recovery Audits and targeted billing inquiries for Medicare over-payments or more appropriate, Medicare fraud activity. This activity is two years old and growing each year with additional force. The writing is/was “on the wall”.
- To fully understand “what” is at the core of the Amedysis issue is to understand the age-old economic axiom that states, “what gets paid for (rewarded) gets done”. Medicare provided a utilization incentive tied to a certain number of therapy visits ($2,200 for 10 visits). Agencies thus targeted patients and developed care practices that maximized the opportunity to garner the incentive payments. In a typical government move, CMS rescinded the incentive payment as it became obvious that agencies were “gobbling-up” the requisite visits and conforming patients to achieve the incentive. A more meager incentive of a few hundred dollars is now provided at six visits, fourteen visits and twenty visits. Oddly enough, companies today seem to provide far more “six visit” encounters than twenty visit encounters (profitability vs. cost for twenty visits as well as a likely evident decline in medical necessity by the twentieth visit). Amedysis of course, is not alone in seeking to tie care provided to reimbursement nor is the home health industry alone in gaming the Medicare reimbursement system for additional dollars. For-profit hospitals, nursing homes and hospice agencies (and non-profits) alike are skilled at “Medicare maximization”, effectively matching what Medicare will pay with certain types of referrals, matched against the costs incurred to care for certain types of patients. This game goes on year-in and year-out with CMS constantly tweaking PPS categories to incent providers to take certain patient types (payment was too low) and to reduce the profitability of other patient types. In short, what gets paid for gets done.
- The PPACA did nothing to reform the system and arguably, it made it worse by attempting to extract funds via reimbursement cuts from Medicare. Of course, it is unlikely these cuts will be fully made or sustained as Congress has never shown the political will required to cut provider payments. By not truly reforming how Medicare reimburses providers for care, the PPACA only served to layer on huge amounts of bureaucracy to an already antiquated reimbursement system. In the end, nothing changed in terms of how Part A and Part B of Medicare pays providers; only the amounts “theoretically” changed. As a system, Medicare pays more for more care and higher acuity care. Providers will naturally gravitate their referral gathering efforts and marshall their care delivery systems toward the patient encounters that create the most “spread” (cost vs. payment). As the overall universe of these “profitable” patients is somewhat fixed, the provider universe is forced to unnaturally stretch the definitional boundaries of patient types (upcoding in plain health care vernacular). In other words, there are not enough truly “organically” existing patients that fit the best (most profitable) reimbursement categories but there enough that are perhaps, at the fringes. Add the fringe patients with a bit of creative tweaking via assessment and documentation to those that organically exist (fit the exact patient type) and presto, sufficient current volume for all providers. The difficulty for regulators and others who would charge that the fringe patients are not truly members of the organic group (those whose care requirements exactly match a certain reimbursement category or categories) is “proof”. The provider and medical communities are far better versed in assessment techniques and documentation requirements and as such, little can be done to reign in this reimbursement “three-card Monty” game. Until the reimbursement is reformed to reward better, more appropriate and efficient care versus “more” care, the over-reimbursement problem will remain, as it has for decades dating back to when providers ballooned certain costs to receive higher per diem rates from Medicare (under the cost-based reimbursement system).
What comes next in this paradigmatic shift in the home health world is merger/consolidation. As the profitability of one element of Medicare business shifts, larger agencies will acquire smaller to medium-sized agencies in order to increase market-share, lever infrastructure, and to supplement lost incremental margins with volume. Simply put, if the relative margin for one type of encounter shrinks, recouping that lost margin (or at the least the majority of it) becomes a function of incurring more encounters with smaller margins. As long as the incremental costs of additional capacity to handle greater volume remains in a ratio, lower than the net revenue received from the greater number of “less profitable” encounters, it is possible to generate a similar level of organization-wide, net operating income. The fastest and arguably most efficient way to create incrementally more encounters is to acquire someone else’s encounters at a price-point that is sufficiently low enough to create virtually (virtually to mean within a short time-frame) instant margin via the increased volume/market-share.
In effect, smaller agencies with less volume to spread the reimbursement loss/risk become attractive targets in this environment. A smaller agency’s value drops as its revenue/margins shrink and with limited geographic presence and referral markets to spread the lost revenue risk across, the entity price declines. The decline in entity price is attractive for a large acquirer seeking solely market share and/or incremental volume. In short, the acquirer is capable of paying less for the economic value of the entity (it has declined or will declined) which it really doesn’t want, save the referral market or incremental patient volume which it desires. The value is purely found in the market share or referral base, not in the economic metrics or financial value of the entity. For a larger provider, acquiring smaller agencies within areas that the larger provider presently doesn’t serve or undeserves is the goal. The “merger” is almost protectionist; protecting profit margins or revenue streams that are shrinking by increasing volume and thus (hopefully), more overall revenue, equalizing the lost revenue once gained per encounter during periods of higher reimbursement.
In the next post, Part II, I’ll review what is going on in the hospice industry and why the Gentiva/Odyssey transaction is significant in terms of a harbinger of activity yet to come.
Doc Fix Survives, Medicaid Ehanced Match Doesn’t
In another procedural vote on the revamped Jobs bill in the Senate, Democrats fell short of mustering 60 votes to end a Republican filibuster, effectively ending for now, legislative efforts to extend unemployment benefits. The vote count was 57 to 41 to continue debate. Dying with the extension of unemployment benefits are a series of pro-business tax cuts, tax increases on domestically produced oil and on investment fund managers as well as the extension of the enhanced Medicaid match provided in the Stimulus bill, set to end December 31 of this year.
In an attempt to keep the bill alive, Senate democrats removed the provision related to Part B/physician fee schedule cuts and crafted a smaller, temporary fix (see my posts from last week on this same subject). This separate “temporary” patch provides for a 2.2% increase in the Part B fee schedule and delays any cuts to physician fees until November 30. Prior legislative efforts deferred the fee schedule cuts, pegged at 21%, until June 1 of this year. This past week, CMS began paying claims incurred after June 1 at the reduced fee schedule rate. In response to an enormous push-back from physicians and the health care community in general, the House passed this temporary Senate measure, sending the bill to the President for signature. Assuming the President signs the bill, providers that have submitted claims for services provided after June 1, will have to re-submit their claims to assure correct payment, including the modest increase of 2.2%.
What’s next (as I have been asked routinely over the past two-weeks)? Is the enhanced Medicaid match extension dead? Legitimate questions, no doubt. In brief, here’s my take or EWAG (educated, wild-assed guess).
- Typically, when legislation such as this stalls, there is a single, two-ton elephant that needs to be circumnavigated or removed from the room in order for things to proceed. In this case, there are three elephants in the room. First, and larger in size than the other two, is the upcoming mid-term elections. The current “tone” in electoral politics is not good for Democrats and decidedly, anti-incumbent, anti-big government, and bail-out weary. Any legislation that looks-like and feels-like a bail-out is perceived as poisonous by incumbents headed toward a November election date. Even seats once believed safe, are up for grabs and some, such as Sen. Boxer in California and Sen. Reid in Nevada, are considered bell-weather contests marking a shift in electorate sentiment (assuming losses on the part of Boxer and Reid). The second elephant is the rising federal debt, now at $13 trillion and climbing. This elephant is a cousin of the first and the Democrats are beginning to feel ownership, correctly or incorrectly, of this elephant. With the EU struggling with an enormous debt load, principally due to burgeoning social welfare programs and a slow economy, economists, the Fed, and investment rating agencies such as Moody’s, are warning that the U.S. debt load could pose the same level of risk to the economy as is present across much of the EU. In fact, the U.S. debt load is perilously close to the value of the GDP; an indicator of a level of negative economic wealth (more debt than assets). Saving an economic lesson for later, the rising debt load is potentially crippling in so many ways to a recovering economy (enough said for now). The third elephant is the moribund U.S. economy, incapable of soaking up large additional amounts of debt and virtually non-responsive to the government’s deficit spending in the form of targeted stimulus. Simply put: The Stimulus and the continued bail-out packages coming from Washington have done virtually nothing to stimulate recovery while adding billions to the debt level. Arguably, the instability and the spending levels have hurt the recovery more than helped. With these three elephants present today in the House and in the Senate chambers, very little prior to November (mid-term elections) can get done and what will get done will be temporary in nature (the doc-fix for example).
- I’m not sure that the enhanced or extension of the enhanced Medicaid match is dead but it is definitely, on life-support in its current form. It seems that the tone of this Congress now is to avoid issues that include big price tags unless such an issue is immediately pressing (the doc-fix) and can be pushed every so slightly, down the road, but just by a bit. The problem here is that many states are stuck with June 30 fiscal years and/or balanced budget requirements. For these states, the uncertainty of additional Medicaid match dollars from the Feds requires establishing a plan that includes cuts, reimbursement and benefit levels combined. The real devil in some cases, is for states that have expanded their Medicaid programs via the use of added match funds through the Stimulus, as the expansion components cannot be cut by law. The additional funds via the Stimulus bill came with “golden handcuffs”, requiring states that used the funds via expansion, to maintain these services. In short, Medicaid is a real mess but frankly, that is nothing new given how ridiculous its financing provisions are and how “federal” money hungry the states have become, selling their fiscal stability souls for additional federal funds and then shifting budget problems elsewhere, hoping new or additional federal money would continue, bailing out their current spending sins.
- The logic of once again deferring the Part B cuts, now to November, is to buy Congress time to craft a permanent solution. Anyone who buys this rhetoric needs professional counseling. This issue is nowhere close to a permanent fix as such a fix requires political willpower (non-existent today), a revisit to the recently passed PPACA where the budget numbers are already out of whack, and finally, a commitment to spend new money as part of the solution. Fixing the problem means abandoning the flawed sustainable growth formula, recasting the actual costs associated with the PPACA (estimates of deficit reduction relied heavily on unsustainable and impractical Medicare cuts), and finding new money within the budget, deficit or not, to create parity and stability within the Part B fee “world”.
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