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Senior and Post-Acute Healthcare News and Topics

Stuck in Neutral: Bundled Payments and Post-Acute Providers

After CMS nixed the mandatory expansion provisions for Bundled Payments and reduced the metro areas participating in CJR (joint replacement), the prospects for post-acute provider involvement in non-fee-for-service initiatives (payments and incentives based on disease states and care episodes) went in to limbo.  With a fair amount of excitement and trepidation building on the part of the post-acute world about different payment methodologies, new network arrangements, new partnerships, incentive possibilities, etc., CMS put the brakes on the “revolution”; a screeching halt.

While Bundled Payments aren’t dead by any means, the direct relationships for post-acute providers are in “neutral”.  The Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Advanced (BPCI Advanced) initiative announced in January included no avenue for SNFs, HHAs (home health) to apply and participate.  Nationally, other voluntary bundle programs continue including the remnants of CJR, and Models 2, 3 and 4 in Phase II.  According to CMS, as of April of this year, 1100 participants were involved in Phase 2 initiatives.  The Phase 2 initiatives cover 48 episodes of care ranging from diabetes, through various cardiac issues and disease to UTIs.

BPCI Advanced opportunities (episode initiators) involve hospitals or physician groups.  Post-acute will still play a role but the direct connections and incentives aren’t quite tangible or specific, compared to CJR.  Time will tell how the roles for post-acute providers evolve in/with BPCI Advanced.  Oddly enough, the economic realities of care utilization and negative outcome risk suggest that post-acute should play a direct, large role. As hospital stays shorten, outpatient and non-acute hospital surgical procedures increase, the directed discharge to post-acute has taken on greater meaning in the care journey.  HHAs in particular, are playing an expanded role in reducing costs via enhancements to their ability to care for more post-surgical cases direct from the hospital/surgical location.  Simultaneous however, readmission risk exposure increases.  What is certain is that system-wide, the window of 30 to 90 days post hospital or acute episode is where significant efficiency, quality and cost savings improvement lies.

While the direct opportunities initially forecast under BPCI for the post-acute industry have evaporated (for now), strategic benefits and opportunities remain.  Providers should not stray from a path and process that focuses on enhancing care coordination, improving quality and managing resource utilization.  Consider the following:

  1. For SNFs, PDPM (new proposed Medicare reimbursement model) incorporates payment changes and reductions based on length of stay (longer stays without condition change, decrease payment after a set time period).  A premium is being placed on getting post-acute residents efficiently, through their inpatient stay.
  2. For HHAs, payment reform continues to focus on shorter episodes in the future.  Like PDPM for SNFs, the focus is on efficiency and moving the patient through certain recuperative and rehabilitative phases, expeditiously.
  3. Medicare Advantage plans are increasing market share nationwide.  In some markets, 60% of the post-acute days and episodes are covered by Medicare Advantage plans – not fee-for-service. These plans concentrate on utilization management, ratcheting stay/episode length and payment amounts, down.  Providers that again, are efficient and coordinate care effectively will benefit by focused referrals and  improved volumes.
  4. Quality matters more than ever before – for all providers.  Star ratings are increasingly important in terms of attracting and retaining referral patterns  Networks and Medicare Advantage plans are focused on sourcing the highest rated providers.  Upstream referral sources, concerned about readmission risks are targeting their discharges to the higher rated providers.  Consumers are also becoming more market savvy, seeking information on quality and performance.  And of course, government programs such as Value-Based Purchasing place providers with poor performance on key measures (readmissions for SNFs) in the reimbursement reduction pool.
  5. Indirectly, Bundled Payment initiatives move forward and the Advanced option will require physicians and hospitals that participate, to source the best referral partners or lose incentive dollars and inherit unwarranted readmission risk.  SNFs and HHAs that excel at care coordination, length of stay management, have disease pathways in-place, can manage treatment, diagnostic and pharmacology expenses and produce exceptional outcomes and patient satisfaction are the preferred partners.
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June 29, 2018 Posted by | Home Health, Policy and Politics - Federal, Skilled Nursing | , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Interoperability and Post-Acute Implications

I’m not sure how many of my readers are following the subject and CMS stance/policy on interoperability among providers but the concepts and resultant debate are rather interesting.  I am trying to encourage as many clients and readers to tune-in on this subject as the implications are sweeping – positively and negatively.

Interoperability in this context means the ability of computer systems or software to exchange and/or make use of information for functional purposes.  In health care, the genesis of the interoperability concept began with HIPAA in the nineties.  HIPAA spawned the HITECH Act in 2009 which ultimately created Meaningful Use.  For anyone unfamiliar with Meaning Use and its incentive provisions, think no further than Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) and quality reporting.  The IMPACT Act is an analogous outgrowth of blended concepts between Meaningful Use, Value-Based Purchasing and Interoperability.  Conceptually, the goal is to create data measures that have “meaning” in terms of clinical conditions, outcomes, patient care and economics.  Ideally, data that matters and can be shared will improve outcomes, improve standardization of care and treatment processes and reduce cost through reduced waste and duplication.  Sounds simple and logical enough.

In April of this year, with the roll-out of various provider segment Inpatient PPS proposed rules for FY 2019, CMS included proposals to strengthen and expedite, interoperability.  The concept is contained within the SNF and Hospital proposed rules.  The twist however, is that CMS is changing its tone from “voluntary” to “mandatory” regarding expediting or advancing, interoperability. Up until this point, Meaningful Use projects that advanced interoperability goals were incentive driven; no punishment.  Among the options CMS is willing to pursue to advance interoperability are new Conditions of Participation and Conditions for Coverage that may include reimbursement implications (negative) and fines for non-compliance and non-advancement.  In the SNF 2019 Proposed Rule, providers are mandated to use the 2015 Edition of Certified Health Record/Information Technology in order to qualify for incentive payments under VBP and avoid reimbursement reduction(s).  For those interested, the 2015 Certified EHR Technology requirement summary is available here: final2015certedfactsheet.022114

The possible implications for providers are numerous – positive and negative.  The greatest positive implication is a (hopeful) rapid escalation of software systems that can share functional data directly without having to build and maintain separate interfaces (third-party).  Likewise, the proposed regulations will facilitate faster development of Health Information Exchanges (HIEs).  Many states have operating HIEs but provider participation and investment has been limited.  A quick interoperability interchange is via an HIE versus separate, unique data and software platform integration.  As SNFs and HHAs have MDS and OASIS assessment requirements on admission, fluid patient history, diagnoses/coding exchange and treatment history will facilitate faster and more accurate, MDS/OASIS completion – a real winner. Dozens of other “tasky” issues can be addressed as well such as portions of drug reconciliation requirements by diagnosis on admission, review of lab and other diagnostic results, order interchanges and interfaces, etc.

The most negative implication for providers is COST.  In reality, the post-acute side of health care isn’t really data savvy and hasn’t really kept pace with software and technology developments.  Many providers are small.  Many providers are rural. Many providers maintain primarily paper records and use technology only minimally.  Full EHR for them is impractical and with present reimbursement levels, unlikely any time soon.  The second most negative implication for providers is the fragmentation that exists among the system developers and software companies in the health care industry.  The “deemed” proprietary nature of systems and their software codes has limited collaboration and cooperation necessary to advance interoperability. HIEs were supposed to remedy this problem but alas, not yet and not at the magnitude-level CMS is foretelling within its Proposed Rules.

Interoperability is needed and amazing, conceptually.  The return is significant in terms of improvements in outcomes and reductions in waste and cost.  Unfortunately, the provider community remains too fragmented and inversely incentivized today to jump ahead faster (money not tied to integration and initiatives among providers).  Software systems don’t work between providers in fashions that support the interoperability goals.  More troubling: the economics are daunting for providers that are not seeing any additional dollars in their reimbursements, capable of supporting the capital and infrastructure needs part and parcel to additional (and faster), interoperability.

 

June 27, 2018 Posted by | Home Health, Policy and Politics - Federal, Skilled Nursing | , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

CMS Proposes Reintroduction of Pre-Payment Review for Home Health (with a twist)

In a memo set for release today, CMS is proposing to reintroduce pre-payment review (with a twist) for Home Health claims.  The memo version is here: HHA Pre Payment Recall, CMS first introduced pre-payment review in August 2016, starting in Illinois.  The process required agencies to submit claim-related data BEFORE receiving final payment or face an adjustment in their payment of minus 25%.  This reduction could not be appealed. Providers could resubmit additional data to achieve full affirmation of their claim PRIOR to submitting final billing for the claim.  After a certain threshold of claims was reviewed and determined proper, the pre-payment process would sunset for the agency.

The initial trial that began in Illinois was such a debacle for agencies and the industry due to the time delays and criterion laxity, slowing cash flow and increasing administrative burden that Congress finally stepped in and put the program on hiatus.  The Illinois experiment was so initially bad that further expansion to other states (Florida was next), never occurred.

In this new proposal which will open for comment (60 days) after publication in the Federal Register, CMS is keeping the program design constant with a couple of twists.

  1. Providers/Agencies in the demonstration states of Illinois, Ohio, Florida, North Carolina, and Texas will be able to choose whether to submit data to the MAC (Medicare Administrative Contractor) for review on a pre-claim or post-claim/payment basis.
  2. Providers/Agencies may opt-out of the payment review (pre or post) by accepting payments at a discounted rate – minus 25%.

As with the former program, providers/agencies will need to meet an acceptable level of affirmed claim submissions (pre or post) to move to an episodic review standard.  In effect, after the agency has been subject to sufficient claim reviews and found to be compliant with required documentation and billing standards, the agency transitions to an “every so often” sampling of claims.  As before, providers that fail to submit data or elect pre or post payment reviews will see claim payments automatically discounted by 25%.

The rationale from CMS to return to this review process is the same as before; assurance of claim accuracy and fraud reduction.  CMS continues to believe that HHAs are sloppy and negligent enough in their claims process that improper payments are too high (as a percent of all claims) and or fraud, still prevalent enough to warrant a program of systematic review. Of course, as of now, CMS can offer no assurance that the next incarnation of claim reviews will go smoother than the 2016 experience.  The belief is that lessons were learned and steps put in-place by the MAC to smooth out reviews and not harm agency financial status or create undue additional burden.  Frankly, I hold no such expectation or belief that the process will be markedly better.

May 31, 2018 Posted by | Home Health | , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

CMS Proposes New SNF Payment Model

Last Friday, CMS released the contents of its annual proposed rule updating the SNF PPS plus (as always), fine tuning certain related programmatic elements. Final Federal Register Publication is set for May 8.  (Anyone wishing the PDF version may download it from the Reports and Other Documents page on this site or access it here SNF Proposed Rule 4 2018 ).  The most watched information for providers is the proposed rate adjustment though lately, for the post-acute segments of health care, other elements pertaining to payment model changes have eclipsed rate “watching”.

Last year’s proposed rule for the SNF PPS contained the release of RCS-1.  After extensive commentary, CMS pulled back RCS-1, shelving it for some conceptual remake.  We now, as of Friday, know the remake – PDPM for short (Patient Driven Payment Model). As with all yearly releases similar, a comment period has begun, lasting until (if not otherwise extended) the last week of June (June 26).

PDPM as proposed, is designed to replace the current SNF payment methodology known as RUGs IV.  Unless date changes, etc. are made by CMS post commentary review, the effective date of the change (from RUGs to PDPM) is 10/1/19 (next October).   PDPM as an outgrowth of RCS-1 and received commentary, is a simplified payment model designed to be more holistic in patient assessment, capture more clinical complexity, eliminate or greatly reduce the therapy focus by eliminating the minute levels for categorization, and simplifying via reduction, the assessment process and schedule (reduced to three possible assessments/MDS tasks). Below is a summary of PDPM core attributes/features as proposed.  On this site in the Reports and Other Documents page is the PDPM Calculation Worksheet that provides additional details beyond the reference points below PDPM Calculation for SNFs.

  • PDPM uses five, case-mix adjusted components for classification and thus, payment: PT, OT, Speech, Non-Therapy Ancillary and Nursing.
  • For each of these components, there are separate groups which a resident may be assigned, based on MDS data.  For example, there are 16 PT groups, 16 OT groups, 12 Speech groups, 6 Non-Therapy Ancillary groups and 25 Nursing groups.
  • Each resident, by assessment, is classified into one of the group elements within the component categories. This means that every resident falls into a group within the five case-mix components of PT. OT, Speech, Non-Therapy Ancillary and Nursing.
  • Each separate case-mix component has its own case-mix adjusted indexes and corresponding per diem rates.
  • Three of the components, PT, OT and Non-Therapy Ancillary have variable per diem features that allow for changes in rates due to changing patient needs during the course of the stay.
  • The full per diem rate is calculated by adding the PT, OT, and Non-Therapy Ancillary rates (variable) to the non-adjusting or non-variable Nursing and Speech components.
  • Therapy utilization may include group and/or concurrent treatment sessions provided no more than 25% of the total therapy utilization (by minutes) is classified as group or concurrent.
  • PT, OT, and Speech classification by group within their respective components do not include any function of “time”.  The sole denominator of how much/little therapy a resident receives is the necessity determined by the assessment process and by the clinical judgment of the care team.  In this regard, the minimum and maximum levels are based on resident need not on a predetermined category (RUG level).
  • Diagnoses codes from the hospital on admission (via ICD-10) are important and accuracy on the initial MDS (admission) are imperative.
  • Functional measures for Therapy (PT, OT) are derived from Section GG vs. Section G as provided via RCS-1.
  • The Non-Therapy Ancillary component allows facilities to capture additional acuity elements and thus payment, for additional existing comorbidities (e.g., pressure ulcers, COPD, morbid obesity, etc. ) plus a modifier for Parenteral/IV feeding.
  • There are only three Medicare/payment assessments (MDS) required or predicated starting in October of 2019 – admission, change of condition/payment adjustment and discharge. NOTE: All other required MDS submissions for other purposes such as QRP, VBP, Quarterly, etc. remain unchanged.

For SNFs, the takeaways are pretty straight-forward. First, clinical complexity appears to be the focus of increased payment opportunity.  Second, therapies are going to change and fairly dramatic as utilization does not involved minutes and more is better, when clinically appropriate but less is always relevant (if that makes sense).  The paperwork via MDS submissions is definitely less but assessment performance in terms of accuracy and clinical judgment is increased.   MDS Coordinators, those that are exceptional clinicians and can educate and drive a team of clinicians, will be prized as never before.  RUG style categorization is over so the focus is not on maximizing certain types of care and thus payment but on being clinically savvy, delivering high quality and being efficient.  The latter is what I have been preaching now for years.  Those SNFs that have been trending in this direction, caring for clinically complex patients, not shunning the use and embrace of nursing RUGs, and being on the ball in terms of their assessments and QMs are likely to see some real benefits via the PDPM system.

More on this new payment model and strategies to move forward will be in upcoming posts.

May 1, 2018 Posted by | Policy and Politics - Federal, Skilled Nursing, Uncategorized | , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

SNF Outlook: 2018/2019

As 2017 closed, a number of projects kept me busy right up to the Christmas holiday.  Among these projects was a focus on the SNF industry current and its fortunes going forward, principally driven by clients in the investment industry.  With REIT troubles, portfolio defaults on the part of HCR and Consulate, Sabra divesting Genesis facilities and Genesis completely exiting Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska and Kansas plus nervousness over rising debt levels and increasing operating expenses (before interest/debt and rent) at Ensign, there is growing concern about “blood in the water”….and when (do) the sharks arrive, particularly for REITs which hold a large number of the physical SNF assets. Back in May of 2017 I wrote a post on the Kindred, HCR, REITs and where the SNF industry was headed.  Readers can refresh here: https://wp.me/ptUlY-m7 . For this post, its time to re-examine the industry economically and structurally and the policy and industry dynamics at-play that will affect the fortunes of the SNFs and the firms that invest in them or the industry.

First, its important to understand the general health policy and reimbursement dynamics at-play in the SNF industry.

  • Phase II Transition of  New SNF Conditions of Participation: Starting in December of 2017, the Phase II survey requirements began corollary to the new SNF Conditions of Participation.  Given a fairly aggressive industry lobbying push to CMS and the Trump Administration with respect to “regulatory overreach and burden”, CMS eased compliance requirements but did not abate any survey or compliance requirements related to Phase II.  In easing compliance requirements, CMS agreed to not impose remedies for Phase II non-compliance and not to impact Star Ratings under the Inspections component for one year.  Given how many SNFs are struggling already with compliance issues and the cost of implementation and compliance, a one-year hiatus for remedies isn’t much of a reprieve.
  • Value-Based Purchasing: Beginning in October of 2018 (FY 2019), SNFs with poor performance (below the target) on the 30 day readmission elements measured under VBR will see their Medicare reimbursement reduced by 2%.  Conversely, high-performing facilities will see a modest incentive, up to 2%, added to their reimbursement.
  • Medicare: In addition to a reimbursement outlook that is flat, a new looming specter has appeared known as RCS-1.  RCS-1 is the proposed new resident classification system for reimbursement for SNFs.  If CMS pushes forward on the time table noted in the proposed rule, the first phase of changes could begin as early as October of 2018 (FY 2019).  For SNFs that rely heavily on the rehabilitation RUGs in the present PPS system, the transition could be expensive and painful as therapy in the new system is UNDER rewarded in terms of “more equaling more payment” and a premium is placed on the overall case-mix including nursing, of the SNF’s Medicare population.  Further, lengths of stays are targeted for shortening as the reimbursement model under RCS-1 reduces payment by 1% per day as the resident’s stay progresses beyond the 15th day.  While the proposed model is “expenditure neutral” per CMS, there will be clear winners and losers.  Winners are facilities that have a balanced Medicare “book” or case-mix (nursing and therapy).  Losers are the facilities that have parlayed the “more minute, longer length of stay system”, focused on the highest therapy paying RUG categories.  These categories evaporate and the payment mechanics with them.
  • Medicaid: This payment source continues to be a revenue center nightmare for most SNFs in most states.  Medicaid underpays as a general rule, an SNF, compared to its daily cost of care for an average resident. As a result, the net loss an SNF will achieve for each Medicaid resident day can be minimal to jaw dropping (depending on the State).  For example, in Wisconsin, the average loss per Medicaid day exceeds $55.00.  This means that for every day of care reimbursed by Medicaid, an SNF must make-up via other payers, the $55.00 loss that comes from Medicaid.  An average SNF has fifty percent of its resident days paid for by Medicaid.  In a 100 bed facility in Wisconsin (assuming 100% occupancy), the facility loses daily, $2,750.  For a month, the loss total expands to $82,500 and for a year, just below one million dollars ($990K). Neighboring states such as Iowa (loss of $12 per day) and Illinois (loss of $25 per day) have better reimbursement ratios per daily cost but present other challenges. For example, Illinois has such overall budgetary problems that annually,  facilities must accept IOUs in lieu of payment as the State runs short of funds.  Kansas and Missouri had rate cuts this past year.  Only two states in the nation in 2016 has surplus rates under Medicaid – North Dakota and Virginia (Virginia is basically break-even).

Adding to this picture are the market and economic forces that provide additional headwinds for many (SNFs).

  • Medicare Advantage: 2018 will mark the year where 50% of all Medicare days for SNFs are paid by non-fee for service sources/plans; the dominant being Medicare Advantage.  In some metro regions, Medicare Advantage days already eclipse the 50% mark (Chicago for example).  Because there remains a surplus of SNFs beds in most if not nearly all markets, the Medicare Advantage plans have been able to set price points/ reimbursement rates below the Fee for Service rate; in most case, minus 10% to 15% lower.  Similarly, these plans focus on utilization and length of stay so rates are not only lower but stays, universally shorter.
  • Bundled Payments and ACOs: While CMS axed the core of the evolving mandatory bundled payments (hip, knee and cardiac), various  voluntary programs/projects are active, fertile and expanding in many markets.  The same is true, though less so, with ACOs.  As with Medicare Advantage but on a more focused basis, these initiatives seek to shorten length of stays, pay less for inpatient care, and focus on quality providers versus generic market locations.  In other words, the incentives for upstream providers (hospitals) under bundled payments  and ACOs is to cherry-pick the post-acute world for high quality, highly rated providers and to work to make the overall post-acute utilization as efficient and non-inpatient related as possible.
  • Care and Point of Service Advances: As technology and innovation in health care and direct surgical and medical care expand, the need for certain types of care services shifts.  Inpatient, post-acute care is seeing its share of “location of care” impact.  Patients once commonly referred to Inpatient Rehabilitation Facilities now hit the SNF.  Patients that may have gone to the SNF post a knee replacement or even a hip replacement, now go home with home health.  With the very real possibility of an equalized post-acute payment forthcoming, the post-acute transformation from a focus on “setting of care determinants” will all but erode.  What this means is that occupancy dynamics will continue to change and building environments that can’t be shifted to a new occupancy demand and patient type, will be obsolete.

Given the above forces, policy dynamics, etc., the overall outlook skews a bit negative for the SNF sector in general.  And while I may be a bit “bearish”, there are some unique opportunities present for properly positioned, properly capitalized providers.  Unfortunately for most investors, these providers and provider organizations are generally private, regional, perhaps non-profit and in nearly all (if not all) cases, not part of a REIT.  Some general facts that bear understanding and reinforcing.

  • By nearly all quantitative measures and expert reviews, the industry is over-bedded (too much capacity) by minimally 25% up to 33%.  This is not to say that any one facility in any one location typifies the stigma but as a whole, a solid 25% of the bed capacity could evaporate and patients would still have ample beds to access.  Remember, the average industry occupancy has shrunk to 80% of beds available.
  • Average revenue due to reimbursement changes and the impact of Medicare Advantage and “stuck to declining” Medicaid rates, has shrunk on a per day basis and a Year over Year basis; down from $259 per day in January 2015 to $244 per day in July 2016 (negative 2%).

  • The average age of physical plant across the sector is greater than 25 years (depreciated life).  The average gross age since put into use is older than 30 years.  This means that the typical SNF is larger in scope, very institutional, and expensive to retrofit or modernize.  In many cases, modernization to private rooms, smaller footprints, more common space, etc. comes at a cost greater than any potential Return on Investment scenario.  The winning facility profile today is under 100 beds, all private rooms, moderately to highly amenitized and flexible in design scope and use (smaller allocations of corridor or single use spaces).
  • Quality ratings and performance matters today.  SNFs that rate 3 stars or lower on the Medicare Star system will have trouble garnering referrals, especially for patients with quality payment sources.  It is not easy to raise star levels if the drag is caused by poor survey performance.  In a recent review I did for a project, analyzing the Consulate holdings of a REIT (SNF assets leased by the REIT to Consulate for management and operations), the average Star rating of the SNFs was below 3 stars and the 80th percentile, just above 2 stars).

The general conclusion?  Watch for another rocky year for the SNF sector and particularly, the large public chains and the REITs that hold their assets.  The sector has significant pressures across the board and those pressures are not decreasing or abating.  Still, there will be winners and I look for strong regional players, private localized operators and certain non-profits (health system affiliated and not) to continue to do well and see their fortunes rise.  A change in Medicare payment to RCS-1 will benefit this group but at the expense of the other SNFs in the industry that have not focused on quality, have a disproportionately high Medicaid census and have used Medicare fee for service/therapy/RUG dynamics to create a margin.

January 18, 2018 Posted by | Policy and Politics - Federal, Skilled Nursing | , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The SNF 800 lb. Gorilla – Medicaid

There is an old joke/riddle that goes like this: “Where does an 800 lb. gorilla sit? Answer: Anywhere it wants to”. For SNFs and REITs today, that gorilla is Medicaid.  Sure, there are numerous industry headwinds that SNFs face in terms of financial performance;

  • Rising percentage of Medicare Advantage patients as part of the payer mix with implied discounts to fee-for-service of 10% or more.
  • Additional regulatory costs stemming primarily from the new Conditions of Participation, released in 2016.
  • Value-based purchasing.
  • Five Star system savvy referral managers that are steering volumes to certain providers
  • Rising labor costs, primarily at the lower end of the labor pool (CNA, food service, housekeepers, etc.) representing the 50th or more percentile of the SNF labor budget
  • Bundled payments in certain markets
  • Growing diversion of former non-complicated orthopedic patients away from IRFs and SNFs to home health and outpatient

Yet is spite of this list, not one or even a combination is as crippling as the impact of a high percentage of Medicaid patients within an SNF payer mix.

Take Genesis for example.  Genesis stock trades at just above $1.00 per share.  Genesis’ average payer-mix across its SNFs is 73% Medicaid.  This means that 27% of  the remaining payers must make-up for a negative break-even margin rate of no less than 30% for each Medicaid patient.  In some states, the disparity is greater.  In other states, the disparity might be less but the state budget woes delay payments or issue IOUs (Illinois) causing the SNF to finance its own below-cost receivables.  Recent news that Genesis may be the next significant REIT holding default is far from fantasy.

The seemingly large, formerly well-capitalized SNF chains are in peril.  HCR ManorCare is in default to HCP (its primary REIT) to the extent that HCP is seeking receivership for the HCR holdings.  The portfolio has a rent coverage ratio of .76x at the facility level and less than 1x globally.  Signature is in the same boat.  Both have compliance problems with Signature having so scarce a margin that it cannot adequately staff or provide for residents in certain locations such as Memphis (facility denied payment, residents relocated).  HCR faces federal Medicare fraud action(s) that will likely lead to settlement payments, etc. for over-billing in excess of $100 million.

Among these troubled SNF providers, one common thread persists – high average Medicaid census (above 66%) as the primary payer mix in their buildings.  With this high mix of Medicaid patients comes staggering facility level losses or revenue shortfalls that must be made-up by other payers.  Consider Wisconsin as an example.  Wisconsin is a state that maintains a balanced budget and generally, a surplus.  It has no issues paying its bills so SNFs do receive timely payment.  Wisconsin however, grossly underpays its SNFs for their Medicaid residents to the tune of an average of a daily loss of $60 per day in 2013.  Between 2013 and 2015, Wisconsin provided no Medicaid rate increase.  All tolled, Wisconsin facilities experienced a Medicaid loss in this period exceeding $300 million.  This gap is exceeded only by the states of New York and New Jersey.  In Wisconsin, the Medicaid loss for an average SNF patient is made up (if possible) by other payers.  That amount today is well over $100 per day, excluding the cost of an imputed bed tax.  As the average Medicaid census is 65%, 35% of all other payers must pay $100 more to cover the Medicaid loss, before any other margin is applied.

Doing the math: A 100 bed facility with 100 residents has 65 covered by Medicaid. The State pays $175 per day for each Medicaid resident, on average.  The Facility costs are $60 per day higher or $235 per day.  In total, the Medicaid loss per month then is $60 x 65 x 30 (30 day month) or $117,000.  To break-even for the month, the remaining 35 patients must pay $346.43 per day or $235 per day in facility costs plus and additional $111.43 per day to recoup the loss from the Medicaid census. This of course does not include any additional costs related to a bed tax or account for any margin.

While the example is illustrative, it is not an atypical story state to state, save the unique twists that are part of every state program.  For example, Kansas chose to convert its Medicaid program to a “managed” program (in 2014) believing it could run more efficiently, save dollars on administrative costs and still provide adequate reimbursement.  As most states, Kansas chose to “bid” its program to various third-party administrators (insurers such as United Healthcare).  Unlike most states, Kansas chose to convert its entire Medicaid program rather than take a phased-in approach.  For SNFs, this approach has been a disaster.  The bulk of Kansas Medicaid recipients are rural.  Enrollment has been a nightmare and qualification of eligibility even more so. None of the participating administrators were prepared and had systems in-place to qualify promptly, newly eligible residents.  The net is many SNFs face technical payment delays due to having to manage multiple payers plus, difficulty in getting approval for residents that are Medicaid “pending”.  Receivables in total and days in receivable have skyrocketed and the state has yet to make many facilities current or whole.  And, because rate is an issue as is the state budget, the bed tax was increased by $800 per bed, per year.  In doing so, any facility with less than a 50% Medicaid census loses money on the bed tax (additional rate generated by Medicaid less than the bed tax increase).

Where this issue resolves is not apparent.  Proposals from Congress to block grant Medicaid to the states almost universally conclude with Medicaid rate reductions for SNFs.  For some states such as Kansas and Missouri, the outlook is a nominal reduction of 2 to 3% (though this is hardly nominal for the SNFs) in Medicaid spending/support.  The reason?  Rates and program expenditures are meager and lean to begin with.  In Colorado and New Jersey, overall Medicaid spending would reduce by as much as 20% translating to a crippling rate reduction without any additional state support (added state funding).  Both states were Medicaid expansion states under the ACA.

As for the survival and fortune of the SNF industry, the outlook for certain segments and providers is rather bleak.  The Medicaid story does not come with additional dollars for rate support or spending – just the opposite.  While block grants may give states renewed opportunities for innovation, the costs that drive SNF spending are not within the purview of a state to change – namely regulation, capital and staff.  The greatest flexibility a state may have is to infuse additional dollars and spending into SNF diversion programs – namely Home and Community Based Services.  These programs are wonderful for certain levels of care needs but for those frail seniors that typify the long-term resident in a SNF today, they offer no hope or savings.  Like it or not, SNF care for some is very cost-effective and necessary due to the needs of the resident (multiple chronic health problems, lack of family and social supports, mental/cognitive impairments, etc.).

In a recent call with an investment analyst from a private equity group, I was asked if “all was lost” for the sector.  The answer I gave is “no” but for some, the ship is definitely taking on water and it may be too late to avoid sinking.  This is definitely true for HCR ManorCare and perhaps for Genesis.  The question today is the collateral damage that may inure to REITs and other investors.  In brief;

  • Facilities with Medicaid census in excess of 50% will find it exceptionally difficult to generate enough revenue via other sources to cover the Medicaid losses.  Medicare simply is not sufficient in patient volume or rate to offset the losses.
  • Reducing Medicaid occupancy is difficult and not quick.  States do not provide a clear-path for this process and federal regulations don’t allow facilities to simply shed residents because of inadequate payments.
  • Many of the facilities with large (proportionate) Medicaid census are older and typified by bed counts above 75, semi-private rooms, and to a large degree, deferred cosmetic and maintenance issues.  In short: they are below the current market expectation for a paying SNF customer.
  • Taking over the operations or acquiring a number of these facilities with high Medicaid census, doesn’t change the fortunes of the same, directly or quickly.  While fixed costs in the form of rent payments may reduce, the operational headwinds remain the same.  A new operator cannot simply transfer out, Medicaid patients.  Even with a bed reduction plan approved by the State, the SNF is responsible for each resident, relocation, etc.  This process if not fluid or inexpensive.  Changing payer mix is difficult, slow and while occurring, expensive.  Frankly, I have never seen the same done to a facility that was predominantly, Medicaid.
  • The market for these facilities is minimal at best. For REITs, expect valuation changes (negative) as the holding value current is based on acquisition cost and income valuation tied to higher rent multiples.  Clearly, with rent coverage levels below 1, re-basing and re-balancing is next (if not already starting).

August 21, 2017 Posted by | Policy and Politics - Federal, Skilled Nursing | , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Bundled Payment Update

CMS has released the text of the proposed rule with regard to bundled payment status (see my post from earlier today).  The link is here – https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2017-17446.pdf

In summary, here are the high points.

  • No advance of the cardiac and upper femur fracture/traumatic joint repair/replace bundles for 2018.  The reason? As stated in my earlier post.  Lack of consensus on the part of the hospital and provider community in terms of rate and structural episode accuracy is the major cause of collapse.  The complexity to convert crossing DRGs into one episode payment across multiple physician providers was simply too much.
  • With the end of the cardiac bundles, it appears that the cardiac rehab incentive payments have entered limbo.  We’ll await additional rule-making for more guidance and possible restoration.
  • On the existing hip and knee replacement bundles (aka CJR) that are in-effect and mandatory in 67 MSAs, CMS is proposing to cut the mandatory MSA participation in half (34 to remain).  The remaining 34 MSAs are per CMS, higher cost areas that may show efficiencies and care improvements over-time.  Recall in my earlier post that this is one of the problematic elements regarding BPCI – no real evidence of savings and improvement overall.
  • Finally, CMS will give participation flexibility to low volume hospitals and rural hospitals in the remaining CJR mandatory MSAs.

In closing, text in-hand, the news earlier is confirmed and pretty much as expected.  CMS is proffering language around renewed flexibilities, commitment to engage providers and more voluntary models as the future.  At least for now, mandatory and expanded bundled/episode payment models are on semi-permanent hiatus.

August 15, 2017 Posted by | Policy and Politics - Federal | , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Bundled Payment Hiatus….or, Demise?

Within the last few days, CMS/HHS sent a proposed rule to OMB (Office of Management and Budget) that would cancel the planned January 2018 roll-out of the (mandatory) cardiac and traumatic joint repair/replacement bundles.  Specifically, CMS was adding bypass and myocardial infarction DRGs to the BPCI (Bundled Payments for Care Improvement) along with DRGs pertaining to traumatic upper-femur fracture and related joint repair/replacement.  The original implementation date was March, then delayed to May, again delayed to October and then to January 2018.  Additionally, the proposed rule (text yet available) includes refinement proposals for the current mandatory CJR bundles (elective hip and knee replacements).  It is widely suspected that the mandatory nature of the CJR will revert to a voluntary program in 2018.

The question that begs current is this step a sign of hiatus for episodic payments or an all-out demise.  Consider the following;

  • The current head of HHS, Tom Price is a physician who has been anti the CMS Innovation Center’s approach to force-feeding providers, new payment methodologies.  While Price is on the record as favoring payment reform he is also adamant that the same needs to incorporate the industry stakeholders in greater number and length than what CMS has done to date (with the BPCI).
  • Evidence of true savings and care improvement has not occurred, at least to date.  This is definitely true of the large-scale initiatives.  The voluntary programs, in various phases, are demonstrating some success but wholesale success is simply not there or not yet confirmed by data.
  • Providers have railed against bundle complexity and in particular, the short-comings evident for cardiac DRGs which are inherently far more complex than the orthopedic DRGs, at least those that are non-traumatic.

My answer to the question is “hiatus” for quite some time.  While there is no question that value-based care and episodic payments are part of the go-forward reality for Medicare, timing is everything.  There are multiple policy issues at play including the fate of the ACA.  A ripple effect due to whatever occurs with the ACA (repeal, revamp, replace, etc.) will permeate Medicare (to what extent is yet to be determined). I anticipate the current voluntary programs to continue and CMS to return to the drawing board waiting for more data and greater clarity on “where to go” with respect to value-based care programs.

Finally, because bundled payments did have some implications for the post-acute sectors of health care, this possible change in direction will have an impact, albeit small. The cardiac bundles had little to no impact for SNFs or HHAs and only minor impact perhaps, for IRFs (Skilled Nursing, Home Health and Inpatient Rehab respectively).  Traumatic fractures and joint repair/replacement had some impact for inpatient providers, particularly Skilled and IRFs as rarely can these patients transition home or outpatient from the surgical stay.  Some inpatient care is customary and frankly, warranted.

CJR sun-setting may have some broader ramifications.  Right now, CJR has shifted the market dynamic away from a traditional SNF or IRF stay to home health and outpatient.  The results are evidenced by a fairly noticeable referral shift away from SNFs and concomitant Medicare census declines coupled with length of stay pressures (shorter).  Home health and outpatient has benefitted.  Yet to determine is whether this trend is ingrained and evidence of a new paradigm; one that may be permanent.  If the latter is the case, CJR shifting to a voluntary program may not change the current picture much, if any.  My prediction is that the market and the payers have moved to a new normal for voluntary joint replacements and as such, CJR or not, the movement away from inpatient stays and utilization is here to stay.

August 15, 2017 Posted by | Home Health, Policy and Politics - Federal, Skilled Nursing | , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Health Systems, Hospitals and Post-Acute Providers: Making Integration Work

Early into the Trump presidency and health care/health policy is front and center.  The first “Obamacare repeal and replace” attempt crashed and burned.  The upcoming roll-out of the next round of bundled payments (cardiac and femur fracture) is delayed to October from the end-of-March target date.  Logically, one can question is a landscape shift forming? Doubtful.  Too many current realities such as the need to slow spending growth plus find new and innovative population health and payment models are still looming. These policy realities beget other realities. One such reality is that hospitals and health systems must find ways to partner with and integrate with, the post-acute provider industry.

In late 2016, Premier, Inc. (the national health care improvement organization) released the results of a study indicating that 85% of health system leaders were interested in creating expanded affiliations with post-acute providers.  Interestingly, 90% of the same group said they believed challenges to do so would exist (Premier conducted the survey in summer of 2016 via 52 C-suite, health system executives).  Most of the challenges?  The gaps that exist “known and unknown” between both provider segments (acute and post-acute) and the lack of efficient communication interfaces (software) between the segments.

On the surface, bundled payments notwithstanding, the push for enhanced integration is driven by a number of subtle but tactile market and economic shifts.

  1. Inpatient hospital lengths of stay are dropping, driven by an increasing number of patients covered by managed care.  Today, the largest payer source contributor of inpatient days, Medicare, is 30.6% “managed”…and growing.  Medicaid is 62.7% and commercial, nearly 100% (99%). Source: http://www.mcol.com/managed_care_penetration
  2. Payment at the hospital end is increasingly tied to discharge experience – what happens after the inpatient stay.  The onus today is on the hospital (and growing) for increasing numbers of patient types (DRG correlated) to discharge the patient properly such that the same does not beget a readmission to the hospital.  Too many readmissions equal payment reductions.
  3. Population health, focused-care models such as ACOs are evolving.  Their evolution is all about finding the lowest cost, highest quality centers of care.  Other BPCI (bundled payment) initiative projects such as Model 3, focus directly on the post-acute segment of care.  Unlike CJR (and the recently delayed cardiac bundles), the BPCI demonstration that began in 2013 covers 48 episodes of care (DRG based) and has participating providers (voluntarily) operating programs in all four model phases, nationwide.
  4. Patient preference continues to demand more care opportunities at-home.  Never mind the increased risk of complication with longer inpatient hospital stays (the risk of infection, pressure injuries, weight loss, delirium, etc. increases as stays increase), it is patient preference to discharge quickly and preferably, to home with services (aka home care).

Regardless the fate of Obamacare now or in the near future, these trends are unlikely to change as they have been moving separate from Obamacare.  Arguably, the ACA/Obamacare accelerated some of them.  Nonetheless, the baked-in market forces that have emanated from ACOs and care episode payments illustrate that even in infancy, these different models produce (generally) more efficient care, lower costs and improved patient satisfaction and outcomes.

As with any integration approach such as a merger for example, cultural differences are key.  The culture of post-acute care is markedly different from that of acute/hospital care.  For hospitals to appreciate this difference, look no farther than the two key determinants of post-acute culture: regulation and payment.  The depth and breadth plus the scope of survey and enforcement activity is substantially greater on the post-acute side than the acute side.  As an example, observe the SNF industry and how enforcement occurs.  Hospitals are surveyed for re-accreditation once every three years.  The typical SNF is visited no less than four times annually: annual certification and three complaint surveys.

In terms of payment, the scope is drastically different.  While hospitals struggle to manage far more payers than a post-acute provider, the amount that is paid to a hospital is substantially larger than that paid to a post-acute provider.  At one point years back, the differences were substantiated largely by acuity differences across patients.  While a gap still exists, it has narrowed substantially with the post-acute provider world seeing an increase in acuity yet lacking a concomitant payment that matches this increase.

Given this cultural framework, post-acute providers can struggle with translating hospital expectations and of course, vice-versa.  Point-of-fact, there is no real regulatory framework in an SNF under federal law for “post-acute” patients.  The rules are identical for a patient admitted for a short-stay or for the rest of his/her life.  Despite the fact that the bulk of SNF admissions today are of the post-acute variety, the regulations create conformity for residency, presumptively for the long-term.  Taking the following into consideration, a challenge such as minimizing a post-acute SNF stay to eight days for a knee replacement (given by a hospital to an SNF) is logical but potentially fraught with the peril presented by the federal SNF Conditions of Participation.  The SNF cannot dictate discharge.  A patient/resident that wishes to remain has rights under the law and a series of appeal opportunities, etc. that can slow the process to a crawl.  At minimum, a dozen or more such landmines exist in analogous scenarios.

Making integration work between post-acute and acute providers is a process of identifying the “gaps” between the two worlds and then developing systems and education that bridge such gaps. Below is my list (experiential) of the gaps and some brief notes/comments on what to do bridge the same.  NOTE: This list is generally applicable regardless of provider type (e.g., SNF, HHA, etc.).

  • Information Tech/Compatibility: True interoperability does not yet exist.  Sharing information can be daunting, especially at the level required between the provider segments for good care coordination.  The simple facts are that the two worlds are quite different in terms of paper work, billing requirements, documentation, etc.  Focus on the stuff that truly matters such as assessments, diagnoses, physician notes, plans of care, treatment records, medications, diagnostics, patient advance directives and demographics.  Most critical is to tie information for treating physicians so that duplication is avoided, if possible.
  • Regulatory Frameworks: This is most critical, hospital/physician side to the post-acute side, less so the other way.  Earlier I mentioned just one element regarding an SNF and discharge.  There are literally, dozens more.  I often hear hospitals frustrated by HHAs and SNFs regarding the “rules” for accepting patients and what can/cannot be done in terms of physician orders, how fast, etc. For example, it might be OK in the hospital to provide “Seroquel for sleep or inpatient delirium” but it is not OK in the SNF.  HHAs need physician face-to-face encounters just to begin to get care moving, including orders for DME, etc.  There is no short-cut.  Creating a pathway for the discharging hospital and the physician components to and through the post-acute realm is critical to keep stays short and outcomes high… as well as minimize delays in care and readmissions.
  • Resource Differences: Understanding the resource capacities of post-acute, including payment, is necessary for smooth integration.  What this means is that the acute and physician world needs to recognize that stay minimization is important but so is overall care minimization or better, simplification.  Unnecessary care via duplicative or unnecessary medications, tests, etc. can easily eat away at the meager margins that are operative for SNFs and HHAs.  For example, I have seen all too many times where a patient has an infection and is discharged to an SNF on a Vancomycin IV with orders for continued treatment for four more days.  Those four days are likely negative margin for the SNF.  A better alternative?  If possible, a less expensive antibiotic or send the remaining Vancomycin doses to the SNF.  Too many tests, too many medications, too much redundancy erodes post-acute margin quickly.  Finding common ground between providers with shared resource opportunities is important for both segments to achieve efficiency and still provide optimal care.
  • Language Differences: In this case, I don’t mean dialect.  Industry jargon and references are different.  I often recommend cheat-sheets between providers just to make sure that everyone can have a “hospital to SNF to HHA” dictionary.  Trust me, there is enough difference to make a simple working dictionary worth the effort.
  • Education/Knowledge: The gap between staff working in different environments can be wide, particularly as the same relates to how and why things are done the way they are.  For example, therapy.  Physical therapy in a hospital for the acute stay is markedly different than the physical therapy in a home health setting or a SNF setting.  Care planning is different, treatments similar but session length and documentation requirements are vastly different.  The clinical elements are surprisingly similar but the implementation elements, markedly different.  The notion that one staff level is clinically superior to another is long dispelled.  SNF nurses can face as many clinical challenges and perhaps more due to no/minimal immediate physician coverage, as a hospital nurse.  True, there are specialty differences (CCU, Neuro ICU, Trauma, etc.) but at the level where patients flow through acute to post-acute, the clinical elements are very similar.  The aspect of care differences and the how and why certain things are done in certain settings is where interpretation and education is required.
  • System and Care Delivery: While the diagnosis may follow, assuring proper integration among the various levels or elements of care requires systematic care delivery. The best language: clinical pathways and algorithms.  Developing these across settings for an episode of care creates a recipe or roadmap that minimizes redundancy, misinterpretation, and lack of preparation (all of which create bad outcomes).  With these in-place, common acute admissions that beget post-acute discharges, places every care aspect within the same “playbook”.

 

March 28, 2017 Posted by | Home Health, Policy and Politics - Federal, Skilled Nursing | , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

SNF M&A: The Provider Number Trap

Over my career, I have done a fair amount of M&A work….CCRCs, SNFs, HHAs, Physician practices, hospice, etc. While each “deal” has lots of nuances, issues, etc. none can be as confusing or as tricky to navigate as the federal payer issues; specifically, the provider number.  For SNFs, HHAs, and hospices, an acquisition not properly vetted and structured can bite extremely hard post-closing, if provider liabilities existed pre-close and were unknown and/or unknowable.  Even the best due diligence cannot ferret out certain provider number related liabilities.

The Medicare provider number is the unique reference number assigned to each participating provider.  When initially originating as a provider, the organization must apply for provider status, await some form of accreditation (for SNFs it is via a state survey and for HHAs and hospice, via private accreditation) and then ultimate approval by Medicare/DHHS.  As long as the provider that has obtained the number, remains in good standing with CMS (hasn’t had its provider status/agreement revoked), the provider may participate in and bill, Medicare and Medicaid (as applicable).

Provider numbers are assignable under change of control, providing the assuming party is eligible to participate in the Medicare program (not banned, etc.).  Change of control requires change of ownership or control at the PROVIDER level, not the facility or building level.  The building in the case of an SNF, is not the PROVIDER – the operator of the SNF is.  For example, if Acme SNF is owned and operated by Acme, Inc., then Acme, Inc. is the Provider so long as the SNF license in Acme’s state is to Acme, Inc.  Say Acme decides to sell the SNF property to Beta REIT and in turn, Beta leases the facility back to Acme.  Acme no longer owns the building but remains the Provider as it continues to hold the license, etc. consistent with the operations of the SNF.  Carrying this one step further.  Acme decides it no longer wants to run the SNF but wishes to keep the building.  It finds Zeta, LLC, an SNF management/operating company, to operate the SNF and leases the operations to Zeta.  Zeta receives a license from the state for the SNF and now Zeta is the PROVIDER, even though Acme, Inc. continues to own the building.

In the example above regarding Zeta, the typical process in such a change of control involving the operations of a SNF is for Zeta to assume the provider number of Acme.  The paperwork filed with CMS is minimal and occurs concurrent to the closing creating change of control (sale, lease, etc.).  What Zeta has done is avoid a lengthier, more arduous process of obtaining a new provider number, leaving Acme’s number with Acme and applying as a new provider at the Acme SNF location. While taking this route seems appealing and quick, doing so comes with potential peril and today, the peril is expansive and perhaps, business altering.

When a provider assumes the provider number of another entity at change of control, the new provider assumes all of the former provider’s related liabilities, etc. attached to the number.  CMS does not remove history or “cleanse” the former provider’s history. The etc. today is the most often overlooked;

  • Star ratings
  • Quality measures including readmission history
  • Claim error rate
  • MDS data (submitted)
  • Federal survey history
  • Open ADRs
  • Open or pending, probes and RAC audits

The above is in addition to, any payments owed to the Federal government and any fines, forfeitures, penalties, etc.  The largest liability is or relates to, the False Claims Act and/or allegations of fraud.  These events likely preceded the change of control by quite a distance and are either impossible to know at change of control or discoverable with only great, thorough due diligence.  The former in my experience such as whistleblower claims may not arise or be known until many months after the whistleblower’s allegation.  During the interim, silence is all that is heard.  Under Medicare and federal law, no statute of limitation exists for fraud or False Claims.  While it is possible via indemnification language in the deal, to arrest a False Claims Act charge and ultimately unravel the “tape” to source the locus of origin and control at the time of the provider number, the same is not quick and not without legal cost.  Assuming the former provider is even around or can be found (I have seen cases where no such trail exists), winning an argument with CMS that the new provider is blameless/not at fault is akin to winning the Battle of Gettysburg – the losses incalculable.  Remember, the entity that a provider is dealing with is the Federal government and as such, responsive and quick aren’t going to happen.  Check the current status of the administrative appeal backlog as a reference for responsive and quick.

Assuming no payment irregularities occur, the list preceding is daunting enough for pause.  Assuming an existing provider number means assuming all that goes with it.  On the Federal side, that is a bunch.  The assuming party gets the compliance history of the former provider, including the Star rating (no, the rating is not on the SNF facility but on the provider operating the SNF).  As I have written before, Star ratings matter today.  Inheriting a two Star rating means inheriting a “dog that doesn’t hunt” in today’s competitive landscape.  It also means that any work that is planned to increase the Star rating will take time especially if the main “drag” is survey history.  The survey history comes with the provider number.  That history is where RAC auditors visit and surveyors start whenever complaints arise and/or annual certification surveys commence.

The Quality Measures of the former provider beget those of the assuming provider.  This starts the baseline for Value Based Purchasing.  It also sets the bar for readmission risk expectations, network negotiations and referral pattern preference under programs such as Bundled Payments.   Similarly, all of the previous MDS data submissions come with that same provider number, including those that impact case-mix rates under Medicaid (if applicable).  And, not exhaustively last but sufficient for now, all claims experience transfers.  This includes the precious error rate that if perilously close to the limit, can trip with one more error to a pre-payment probe owned, by the assuming provider.  Only extreme due diligence can discover the current error rate – perhaps.

Avoiding the peril of all of the above and rendering the pursuit or enforcement of indemnification (at the new provider’s expense) a moot issue is simple: Obtain a new provider number.  It is a bit time-consuming and does come with a modicum of “brain damage” (it is a government process) but in comparison to what can (and does) happen, a very, very fractional price to pay.  In every transaction I have been directly involved with, I have obtained a new provider number.  In more than one, it has saved a fair amount of go-forward headache and hassle, particularly on the compliance end.  Today, I’d shudder to proceed without a new provider number as the risks of doing so are enormous, particularly in light of the impact of Star ratings, quality measures and survey history.  Additionally, the government has never been more vigilant in scrutinizing claims and generating ADRs.  Inheriting someone else’s documentation and billing risks genuinely isn’t smart today.

While inappropriate for this post, I could list a plethora of examples and events where failure to obtain a new provider number and status has left the assuming provider with an absolute mess.  These stories are now, all too common.  Even the best due diligence (I know because my firm does it), cannot glean enough information to justify such a sweeping assumption of risk. Too much cannot be known and even that which can, should be rendered inconsequential by changing provider status.  Reliance on a definitive agreement and litigation to sort responsibilities and liabilities is not a prudent tactic. Time and resources are (always) better spent, applying for and receiving, a new provider number and provider status.

February 1, 2017 Posted by | Home Health, Hospice, Policy and Politics - Federal, Skilled Nursing | , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments