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Friday Feature: REIT Update

Like all healthcare/senior housing investments during the pandemic, REITs experienced turbulence and stagnant growth. Coming out of the pandemic, the outlook has started to brighten but, challenges remain in adjusting REIT portfolios. The adjustments are fundamentally, selling under-performing assets within their portfolios.

Rebounds in occupancy are providing some bright spots though assets within, remain a bit murky for most senior housing dominant REITs. Nursing home concentrations continue to lag in terms of recovery as average plant age remains “old”, occupancies are depressed (80% ish), operating costs have increased faster than revenues, and liability headwinds are increasing. Yet, some of the larger REITs are seeing their Senior Housing Operating Portfolios more favorably these days post Covid, primarily as product demand remains strong (demographics) and supply in relation, is rather flat to somewhat down (no real building going on). The strongest performance elements remain housing vs. health care or Independent, Assisted and Memory Care versus skilled nursing.

Dissecting where REITs are at, I took and in-depth look at two of the largest with extensive senior housing portfolios – Welltower and Ventas. Each has a different operating approach with Ventas, strictly providing investment and business guidance and infrastructure services and Welltower, actually providing direct management (though not for every asset). In late 2022, Welltower received permission from the IRS to direct manage 45,000 Independent Living units within its portfolio. Below is a summary of where each REIT is at and what they see as an outlook for the remainder of 2023 and early 2024.

Welltower:  First quarter results were better than expected with year-over-year same shop net income growth of 11% advanced by net operating income growth within the senior living portfolio of 23.4%.  The drivers were year-over-year occupancy and revenue growth per occupied room of 6.8%

From an investment perspective, Welltower did $785 million gross of investment activity comprised of $529 million in acquisitions and funded loans alongside $287 million in development funding.  Within this development number were four projects at $57 million.  There was $92 million of property dispositions and loan payoffs.

Welltower continues to rebalance its senior housing property portfolio, reducing SNF holdings and concomitant risk concentration.  As part of this plan, Welltower continued to transition and sell its Pro Medica operated facilities (147 SNFs) to Integra Health Properties. In January, Welltower sold to Promedica, a 15% interest in 31 SNFs for $74 million.  This represents the second piece of a Welltower/Integra 85/15 joint venture.  The remaining components will finalize in 2023.

Going forward, Welltower is expecting continued occupancy improvement to drive same shop operating revenue gains of 9.5%.  Improving labor outlook in terms of hiring and retention is also adding positivity to improved performance outlooks.  Year-over-year occupancy gains are projected at 230 basis points. From their investment presentation: Positive revenue and expense trends are expected to drive YoY SS SHO Portfolio NOI growth of 17% – 24%. 

As the senior housing industry has headwinds, Welltower will no doubt experience some.  The question is, how much and when.  Higher interest rates and a stronger dollar will affect dividends.  The same, could create a recession and thus, drag some occupancy rate projections downward.  A recessionary job market, however, could add incremental labor gains at softer prices (wages).

Ventas: Ventas first quarter earnings report is set for release on Monday, close of market.  We can, however, see a similar recovery trend for Ventas as with Welltower, improving occupancy, more stable expenses, and increasing same shop revenues via improved pricing and occupancy. Fourth quarter 2022 saw an overall portfolio occupancy improvement to 82.5% and a Net Operating Income for the portfolio of 19.1%. 

Like Welltower, Ventas is bullish on demographic trends noting the growth percentage of the 80 plus segment/cohort of the population.  In the next five years, the growth rate for this group is forecasted at 23%.  Couple this demographic shift with a historically low new unit pipeline (COVID and interest rate impacted), unit absorption of existing product begets a favorable occupancy trend, at least in the near term. For Ventas, 99% of their portfolio is in locations with no new construction starts within 5 miles.  A primary market for a senior housing location is 5 to 7 miles.

For occupancy growth, Ventas is projecting year-over-year improvement of between 130 and 170 basis points – a bit less bullish than Omega. Overall portfolio revenue growth of 8% is the forecast with NOI growth at 5%.  They are expecting improved hiring and moderating inflation, along with improved topline revenues, to generate the NOI improvement.

Rent increases and care rate increases are forecasted at 10% and 11% respectively.  What is interesting to me is the forecast on expense improvements.  Labor is pegged at 43% of revenue (61% of expenses) with only 2% equating to contract labor.  That is exceptionally low in today’s market and certainly, not indicative of a trend I have seen among most operators.  In all other expense categories, Ventas if forecasting decreases (-5% taxes, -4% in food, utilities, and maintenance, and -2% in insurance).  This pegs year-over-year expense growth at 5% vs. 2022, at 8%.

To me, the risks of achieving these results are similar to Welltower.  First, moderating labor cost may or may not materialize though, a recession could help.  Interest rate increases could push the economy into a recession, cramping occupancy gains.  Energy is a wild card for me from an inflationary perspective as during a recession, gas/fuel oil will fall via weaker demand and as stronger dollar yet worldwide turbulence, may throw a wrench into this outcome. Insurance costs are rising so it’s odd to me that a savings of 2% is attainable across any senior housing portfolio.

After Monday, I’ll take a peek at Ventas first quarter results and then, add it to my files.  Later summer, I’ll take an overall look at the REIT sector and maybe, drop a quick update to this post.

TGIF!

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May 5, 2023 Posted by | Health Policy and Economics, Senior Housing | , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

SNF Outlook: 2018/2019

As 2017 closed, a number of projects kept me busy right up to the Christmas holiday.  Among these projects was a focus on the SNF industry current and its fortunes going forward, principally driven by clients in the investment industry.  With REIT troubles, portfolio defaults on the part of HCR and Consulate, Sabra divesting Genesis facilities and Genesis completely exiting Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska and Kansas plus nervousness over rising debt levels and increasing operating expenses (before interest/debt and rent) at Ensign, there is growing concern about “blood in the water”….and when (do) the sharks arrive, particularly for REITs which hold a large number of the physical SNF assets. Back in May of 2017 I wrote a post on the Kindred, HCR, REITs and where the SNF industry was headed.  Readers can refresh here: https://wp.me/ptUlY-m7 . For this post, its time to re-examine the industry economically and structurally and the policy and industry dynamics at-play that will affect the fortunes of the SNFs and the firms that invest in them or the industry.

First, its important to understand the general health policy and reimbursement dynamics at-play in the SNF industry.

  • Phase II Transition of  New SNF Conditions of Participation: Starting in December of 2017, the Phase II survey requirements began corollary to the new SNF Conditions of Participation.  Given a fairly aggressive industry lobbying push to CMS and the Trump Administration with respect to “regulatory overreach and burden”, CMS eased compliance requirements but did not abate any survey or compliance requirements related to Phase II.  In easing compliance requirements, CMS agreed to not impose remedies for Phase II non-compliance and not to impact Star Ratings under the Inspections component for one year.  Given how many SNFs are struggling already with compliance issues and the cost of implementation and compliance, a one-year hiatus for remedies isn’t much of a reprieve.
  • Value-Based Purchasing: Beginning in October of 2018 (FY 2019), SNFs with poor performance (below the target) on the 30 day readmission elements measured under VBR will see their Medicare reimbursement reduced by 2%.  Conversely, high-performing facilities will see a modest incentive, up to 2%, added to their reimbursement.
  • Medicare: In addition to a reimbursement outlook that is flat, a new looming specter has appeared known as RCS-1.  RCS-1 is the proposed new resident classification system for reimbursement for SNFs.  If CMS pushes forward on the time table noted in the proposed rule, the first phase of changes could begin as early as October of 2018 (FY 2019).  For SNFs that rely heavily on the rehabilitation RUGs in the present PPS system, the transition could be expensive and painful as therapy in the new system is UNDER rewarded in terms of “more equaling more payment” and a premium is placed on the overall case-mix including nursing, of the SNF’s Medicare population.  Further, lengths of stays are targeted for shortening as the reimbursement model under RCS-1 reduces payment by 1% per day as the resident’s stay progresses beyond the 15th day.  While the proposed model is “expenditure neutral” per CMS, there will be clear winners and losers.  Winners are facilities that have a balanced Medicare “book” or case-mix (nursing and therapy).  Losers are the facilities that have parlayed the “more minute, longer length of stay system”, focused on the highest therapy paying RUG categories.  These categories evaporate and the payment mechanics with them.
  • Medicaid: This payment source continues to be a revenue center nightmare for most SNFs in most states.  Medicaid underpays as a general rule, an SNF, compared to its daily cost of care for an average resident. As a result, the net loss an SNF will achieve for each Medicaid resident day can be minimal to jaw dropping (depending on the State).  For example, in Wisconsin, the average loss per Medicaid day exceeds $55.00.  This means that for every day of care reimbursed by Medicaid, an SNF must make-up via other payers, the $55.00 loss that comes from Medicaid.  An average SNF has fifty percent of its resident days paid for by Medicaid.  In a 100 bed facility in Wisconsin (assuming 100% occupancy), the facility loses daily, $2,750.  For a month, the loss total expands to $82,500 and for a year, just below one million dollars ($990K). Neighboring states such as Iowa (loss of $12 per day) and Illinois (loss of $25 per day) have better reimbursement ratios per daily cost but present other challenges. For example, Illinois has such overall budgetary problems that annually,  facilities must accept IOUs in lieu of payment as the State runs short of funds.  Kansas and Missouri had rate cuts this past year.  Only two states in the nation in 2016 has surplus rates under Medicaid – North Dakota and Virginia (Virginia is basically break-even).

Adding to this picture are the market and economic forces that provide additional headwinds for many (SNFs).

  • Medicare Advantage: 2018 will mark the year where 50% of all Medicare days for SNFs are paid by non-fee for service sources/plans; the dominant being Medicare Advantage.  In some metro regions, Medicare Advantage days already eclipse the 50% mark (Chicago for example).  Because there remains a surplus of SNFs beds in most if not nearly all markets, the Medicare Advantage plans have been able to set price points/ reimbursement rates below the Fee for Service rate; in most case, minus 10% to 15% lower.  Similarly, these plans focus on utilization and length of stay so rates are not only lower but stays, universally shorter.
  • Bundled Payments and ACOs: While CMS axed the core of the evolving mandatory bundled payments (hip, knee and cardiac), various  voluntary programs/projects are active, fertile and expanding in many markets.  The same is true, though less so, with ACOs.  As with Medicare Advantage but on a more focused basis, these initiatives seek to shorten length of stays, pay less for inpatient care, and focus on quality providers versus generic market locations.  In other words, the incentives for upstream providers (hospitals) under bundled payments  and ACOs is to cherry-pick the post-acute world for high quality, highly rated providers and to work to make the overall post-acute utilization as efficient and non-inpatient related as possible.
  • Care and Point of Service Advances: As technology and innovation in health care and direct surgical and medical care expand, the need for certain types of care services shifts.  Inpatient, post-acute care is seeing its share of “location of care” impact.  Patients once commonly referred to Inpatient Rehabilitation Facilities now hit the SNF.  Patients that may have gone to the SNF post a knee replacement or even a hip replacement, now go home with home health.  With the very real possibility of an equalized post-acute payment forthcoming, the post-acute transformation from a focus on “setting of care determinants” will all but erode.  What this means is that occupancy dynamics will continue to change and building environments that can’t be shifted to a new occupancy demand and patient type, will be obsolete.

Given the above forces, policy dynamics, etc., the overall outlook skews a bit negative for the SNF sector in general.  And while I may be a bit “bearish”, there are some unique opportunities present for properly positioned, properly capitalized providers.  Unfortunately for most investors, these providers and provider organizations are generally private, regional, perhaps non-profit and in nearly all (if not all) cases, not part of a REIT.  Some general facts that bear understanding and reinforcing.

  • By nearly all quantitative measures and expert reviews, the industry is over-bedded (too much capacity) by minimally 25% up to 33%.  This is not to say that any one facility in any one location typifies the stigma but as a whole, a solid 25% of the bed capacity could evaporate and patients would still have ample beds to access.  Remember, the average industry occupancy has shrunk to 80% of beds available.
  • Average revenue due to reimbursement changes and the impact of Medicare Advantage and “stuck to declining” Medicaid rates, has shrunk on a per day basis and a Year over Year basis; down from $259 per day in January 2015 to $244 per day in July 2016 (negative 2%).

  • The average age of physical plant across the sector is greater than 25 years (depreciated life).  The average gross age since put into use is older than 30 years.  This means that the typical SNF is larger in scope, very institutional, and expensive to retrofit or modernize.  In many cases, modernization to private rooms, smaller footprints, more common space, etc. comes at a cost greater than any potential Return on Investment scenario.  The winning facility profile today is under 100 beds, all private rooms, moderately to highly amenitized and flexible in design scope and use (smaller allocations of corridor or single use spaces).
  • Quality ratings and performance matters today.  SNFs that rate 3 stars or lower on the Medicare Star system will have trouble garnering referrals, especially for patients with quality payment sources.  It is not easy to raise star levels if the drag is caused by poor survey performance.  In a recent review I did for a project, analyzing the Consulate holdings of a REIT (SNF assets leased by the REIT to Consulate for management and operations), the average Star rating of the SNFs was below 3 stars and the 80th percentile, just above 2 stars).

The general conclusion?  Watch for another rocky year for the SNF sector and particularly, the large public chains and the REITs that hold their assets.  The sector has significant pressures across the board and those pressures are not decreasing or abating.  Still, there will be winners and I look for strong regional players, private localized operators and certain non-profits (health system affiliated and not) to continue to do well and see their fortunes rise.  A change in Medicare payment to RCS-1 will benefit this group but at the expense of the other SNFs in the industry that have not focused on quality, have a disproportionately high Medicaid census and have used Medicare fee for service/therapy/RUG dynamics to create a margin.

January 18, 2018 Posted by | Policy and Politics - Federal, Skilled Nursing | , , , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on SNF Outlook: 2018/2019

Medicaid Reform: Hope for Taming the Gorilla?

A few weeks back, I wrote a piece regarding Medicaid and its ties to the fortunes (lack thereof ) of some the largest SNF provider groups. Today a high percentage of resident census connected to Medicaid as a payer source is the largest contributor to the flagging financial condition of Genesis, HCR/ManorCare, Signature, and others.  With large losses stemming from inadequate Medicaid payments and shrinking sources of offset via Medicare (for a number of reasons), these organizations are perilously close to bankruptcy (or are fundamentally there as is the case with HCR/ManorCare).  For reference, see the previous post at  http://wp.me/ptUlY-mC

As I talk with investors across the nation (and internationally in some cases) interested in the fortunes of the REITs that hold a ton of the Genesis, HCR/ManorCare, et.al., assets (buildings) and or the fortunes of the companies themselves (Genesis is publicly traded with a stock value current, hovering just above $1 per share), I field the same question(s) repeatedly.  How did we get here and what needs to change for these companies to survive, or can they?  Quickly, allow me to recap where the SNF industry and particularly the groups aforementioned and others like them, is at.

  • First and most crippling, their dominant payer source is Medicaid. In the case of Genesis and HCR/ManorCare, above 66% on average in each SNF.
  • Medicare Advantage is a growing piece of the Medicare payer equation. In some markets, Medicare Advantage plans account for more than 50% of the Medicare patient days in a SNF referral stream.  These payers (the Advantage plans) are paying at Medicare MINUS levels.  Medicare minus 10% is phenomenal, if attainable. In most markets the discount is greater.
  • Most markets have a surplus of available SNF beds (nationally too).  Competition among providers is fierce for quality mix (better payers).  Because of this, the Advantage plans do not (yet) need to negotiate favorable terms as someone, somewhere will accept the discount; preferable to the vacant bed.
  • The policy landscape is adjusting to a new reality in which Stars matter.  Higher rated (Five Star) providers are now favored by payers, providers and consumers alike.  The steerage has started and it won’t subside.   Hospitals to physicians to consumer groups and payers preference is toward providers rated 4 Stars or higher.  While this pressure is yet overt, its subtle and growing and I hear it constantly as hospitals for example, won’t abide readmission risk and if they are in bundled or other at-risk payment projects (physicians too), they seek better partners (quality ratings) to handle their referrals.
  • There is a distinct preference shift among physicians, consumers and payers (bundled for example as well Medicare Advantage) to minimize inpatient stays both by length or by necessity.  Certain orthopedic profiles that once were a SNF staple (joint replacements) good for a 20 plus day Part A stay at high therapy RUGs either don’t last 20 days or don’t get referred at all.  I am seeing a wholesale shift of these patients to home health and outpatient primarily, followed by short (demanded) stays, 40 to 50% fewer in days, on an inpatient basis.  This volume change has demonstrably hurt certain SNF provides formerly reliant on it to offset Medicaid losses.
  • The physical plant assets are old, oversized, and dated.  The new, successful SNF model is smaller buildings, all private rooms, nicely appointed.  Genesis, et.al., represent some of the largest and oldest plant assets in the industry.  They are inefficient, institutional, and in many cases, burdened by high rent payments and comparably, high levels of deferred upkeep and maintenance (particularly interiors and movable equipment). Wholesale renovation is impractical as the investment is greater than the return on assets attainable now and across the near-horizon.
  • The regulations, especially the newly updated Federal Conditions of Participation for SNFs, phasing in as I write, are crippling to these providers.  These new regulations are coming with increasing cost while reimbursement options are flat to decreasing (Missouri and Kansas just had Medicaid rate cuts).  The Medicare increase for FY 2018 is 1%.  These new regulations require in some cases, wholesale changes to how SNFs operate when it comes to analyzing staffing needs, resident preferences, food and cultural issues, etc., all concurrent to REDUCTIONS in Medicaid rates.

So, to the point of this piece and the question that bears: What needs to change with respect to Medicaid to abate the problems present?  Secondarily, is there a survival/revival scenario for Genesis, Signature, HCR, et.al.?  I’ll answer the second question first as the first, is harder to sort through.

  • The business model of Genesis, Signature, etc. today is misaligned to the industry revenue/payer and market incentives.  There simply is no quick fix to repurpose the assets and to change the quality ratings and payer-mix, to make many of the facilities viable.
  • Their fixed costs are too high in terms of rent payments.  The REITs have a valuation problem as their books hold an asset today at a value that is by all definitions, impaired.  The valuation is based on cash flow which simply, in terms of rent payments, is no longer attainable.  Think about it: Rent coverage levels below 1 aren’t sufficient today to keep payments current.   A few articles back on this site, I wrote a piece regarding “Stranded Assets”.  This covers these concepts in-depth: http://wp.me/ptUlY-ms
  • Supply exceeds demand in many markets in terms of bed capacity.  Current SNF occupancy runs in the 85 to 88% range in most markets.  This today, is net of beds removed from service in many states to avoid paying (additional) bed tax or getting hit with Medicaid rate reductions and a loss of bed-hold payments for failure to meet occupancy levels (typically 90 plus percent).

The answer: Survival as is not likely and the industry needs to re-base again in terms of valuations, operators and capacity.  The underlying forces that took us to this current paradigm will not shift soon enough or demonstrably favorable (revenue/income), to alter the course for these providers.  I offer that this period is analogous in the incentive changes to the arrival of PPS for the industry in the early 90s.  Rebasing occurred as cost-rate payments disappeared and the rewards tied to “spending” more changed.  During this time, seven of the top 10 SNF organizations went bankrupt, some never to return to publicly traded status.

Turning to the 800 pound gorilla or Medicaid.  Medicaid reform is a significant challenge and without something changing from its present course for SNFs, the fortune for the SNF industry and this payer source is below bleak or grim.  For Medicaid as a payer, SNF care is a small portion of the overall outlay and actually shrinking as other programmatic expansions have consumed growing amounts of resources (Medicaid expansion).  The program drivers are primary physician and hospital care. The primary users of Medicaid today are working poor and their ranks are growing – rural and urban.   As applicable to seniors, Medicaid-waiver benefits have expanded at a far greater rate than SNF care utilization (which has continued to decrease).  Waiver programs, popular for keeping seniors out of institutional settings, have expanded as the needs of an aging society have expanded.

Medicaid is funded principally, by States attaining various levels of revenue, allocating the same toward a Federal funding approach that matches the revenue, and then forwards the Federal share to the state.  As the Feds choose to incent certain Medicaid programmatic initiatives, the Feds may sweeten the pot with enhanced matching dollars or a full (initial ) funding approach such as under Medicaid Expansion.  The flaw in any of these approaches is the temporary nature of the Federal cash subsidy and the limitations imposed to the State that prohibit the State from cutting the outlays conditioned on the Federal incentive.  In other words, the Vegas slot machine effect (just enough payoff to keep you seated and pumping-in dollars anticipating a bigger payoff).  States get hooked and the resort they have to curtailing or balancing their piece of the Medicaid pie (once the Federal piece shrinks) are raising revenue (typically very tough through income taxes hence the bed tax games, tobacco tax games, and the inter-fund related robbery that goes on state to state among schools, highways, gasoline taxes, casino funds, etc.) or cutting provider payments.  It is the latter that has hurt the SNF industry by reference, in this article.

Medicaid in its current form is a broken system and one that was bastardized to break with the ACA.  Expansion hastened its demise, though it was on life support when the ACA was passed and implemented.  It has become a catch-all basket of anything entitlement, non-Medicare and as a result, it is a mess.  The sad reality is every policy analyst with any cred knows it as does all of the House, the Senate, and everyone at DHHS.  The difficulty is how does something like this get fixed.  The prevailing answer: Punt it back to the states and give them flexibility to “innovate” otherwise known as, the Block Grant approach.  Instead, as I conclude this piece with others sure to follow, consider the following.

  • For an SNF, Medicaid is a rate drag – a loser producing daily revenue shortfalls to cost.  It’s not that the rate may be inadequate its that the costs are too high.  The point here is that without wholesale federal regulatory relief from rules and requirements that haven’t shown any evidence of producing better care outcomes, their is no opportunity to reform Medicaid as a payer adequate enough in rate, for a SNF to survive with a majority Medicaid census.  Simple economics apply: Either rate rises to offset cost increases or costs decrease to allow rate to be adequate to produce and sustain, product quality.  The gap between regulatory increases and overreach and rate inadequacy (Medicaid and to a lesser extent, Medicare) is widening.
  • Block grants won’t work as the whole pie is the reference point rather than the programmatic pieces.  Trust me, the parts of Medicaid have considerably different contextual differences and economic and social drivers.  Funding must be de-aggregated and reimagined at the different levels, separately.  The needs of children, families, etc. are so markedly different from the SNF and waiver needs of the elderly as are the economic and social drivers.  Market strategies can and likely will work with the younger groups whereas the elderly, need a social construct (ala Pace approach) model to achieve investment and outcome balance.
  • The benefits need review and re-think.  This is true however, of all federal entitlements.  Here, states given latitude may have some significant advantage in revamping Medicaid.  The Feds, in a Block Grant approach must be the “bank” or the “capital” not also the architect, general contractor, and job-site superintendent.
  • The Medicaid incentives need reversing and a growing emphasis on private initiatives and insurance needs to occur.  The Feds can play an active role by creating avenues for private investment for retirement, accumulation of capital, use of estate and wealth transfer resources, etc. such that over time, the obligations of government to fund large pieces of the social fabric and needs of old age care, shift more in-balance, to each citizen.  The return on investment of tax advantaged, flexible investing for private insurance, private wealth accumulation used for care and service needs after 65, etc. is far greater (positive) than the loss of or revenue offset of the tax advantage.  We know this to be true via HSAs and 401(k)s and IRAs.
  • Finally, reforming health care will reform (significant step forward) Medicaid and the drivers of cost.  Fixing Medicaid is not a stand-alone issue, so to speak.  The challenge in the U.S. today is to REFORM health care, not reform how it is paid for or who has coverage and how does one access the same.  Spending on health care in the U.S. is disproportionately higher than all other world nations and our return in terms of life expectancy and QUALYs, substandard.  We are investing a $1 and losing 20 or so cents on our investment.  We need to focus on “bending the cost-curve” and not the insurance and welfare/entitlement pieces.  Regulatory reform and streamlining payment and program participation would be a great, simple first-step.

 

 

September 14, 2017 Posted by | Policy and Politics - Federal, Skilled Nursing | , , , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Medicaid Reform: Hope for Taming the Gorilla?

SNFs and Stranded Assets

Lately I’ve written rather extensively on what is occurring in the SNF sector to (rather) dramatically shift the fortunes for companies such as HCR/ManorCare, Kindred, Genesis, Signature, et.al. and a series of REITs that hold SNF assets (physical).  In addition to my writings, I’ve consulted/conversed with numerous investment firms concerned and interested in this shift.  Underlying all of my written thoughts and my discussions is a harsh reality check: A solid third of the industry today (SNF) has assets that I and other industry-watchers would consider/define as stranded.

I have embedded a link to a great article that covers the concept of “stranded assets”.  It is from the HFMA and the focus is on hospitals but the issues are directly analogous to SNF physical plants.  The link is here: http://www.hfma.org/Content.aspx?id=54453

The underlying issues that created this unique asset status are as follows.

  • An SNF physical plant has value if the corresponding cash flow generated from the operations attached to the asset is positive with a margin.  The HFMA hospital reference point is an EBITDA margin of 6% or higher.  Depending on the age of physical plant, deferred maintenance and interest and tax costs, 6% is likely a “non-coverage” situation.  For SNFs owned by REITs, we are seeing EBITDAR equal to a coverage ratio of 1 or less (cash to pay or cover rent costs).  I contend that in this scenario, the asset (SNF) plant is now stranded.
  • Stranded effectively means that the asset (the SNF) has no strategic or business value in the current state (with an EBITDAR coverage equal to 1 or less).  Without significant changes to operations to increase the cash coverage margin, the value of the asset is impaired and by GAAP, should be written down.  NOTE: I am not an accountant/CPA so I will leave any further reasoning or discussion on GAAP requirements, asset impairment and write-downs to the accountancy profession.
  • Important to note about assets/SNFs that are stranded is that short-term advances/improvements in their cash flow may change this status by definition but the same is only temporary.  The market, health policy and other  business shifts away from certain types of institutional care and lower-rated providers is permanent.  SNFs not properly positioned from an asset and operating perspective for these market changes will return to stranded status again and rather quickly.  The point here is this: An asset that is stranded is characterized by,
    • An aged physical plant with deferred maintenance
    • A plant that is not current in terms of market expectations (private rooms, open dining, bistro areas, coffee bars, exercise and therapy gyms, etc.)
    • A plant that is inefficient from a staff and resource perspective (too many units, too spread out, etc.)
    • An asset with operations that have a poor history of compliance, rated below 3 stars, and with marginal to sub-par quality measures.

Today, the strategic value of the asset is tied directly to its ability, along with paired operations, to generate positive cash margins sufficient to cover debt payments or lease payments plus required capital improvements (funded or sequentially incurred period over period). If an asset is truly stranded, changing that position is a strategic and long-term endeavor: An approach that requires wholesale repositioning.  For many SNFs, this approach may not be feasible.

  • The dollars required to reposition the asset from a physical plant perspective are greater in total than the remaining Undepreciated Replacement Value of the plant.  In other words, the cost to reposition is greater than the value of the asset.
  • The return generated from the repositioning is insufficient from an ROI perspective (less than the cost of capital plus the imputed life-cycle cost of depreciation of the improvements).
  • The operations of the asset are also impaired such that the compliance history and Star ratings, etc. are poor (historically) and changing the same would/will require a long-term horizon whereby, the same does not net cash flow improvement during the process.  Referrals and permanent cash-flow improvements are the result of revenue model changes and the same can not occur overnight when Star ratings and compliance improvements are required.  Changing Star ratings from a 3 to 4 for example, can take twelve months or longer.

The take-away points for the industry are simple.  The industry has an abundance of buildings/assets that fit the stranded definition today and a good number reside in REIT portfolios.  These assets/buildings, because of the points above, literally and figuratively, cannot be repositioned.  Their value has shrunk precipitously and there is nothing regarding the circumstances that caused this shift that will change.  Repositioning to avoid or change the stranded status is improbable due to the facts at-hand;

  • The asset is old by current business-need standards, has moderate to significant deferred maintenance issues and improvement to the current standard will cost in-excess of the undepreciated replacement value of the asset.
  • The operations tied to the asset are not highly rated, with strong compliance history and exceptional quality measure performance.
  • The operations and asset together, are incorrectly matched within a market that has higher rated competitors with better outcomes and newer, better positioned physical plants.  The preferred referrals for quality payers has moved to these competitors and the drivers such as bundled payments, value-based purchasing, Medicare Advantage plans, etc., plus a movement away from institutional care (to shorter stays, fewer stays) has altered the demand factors within the market.

In all probability, the above foreshadows a shrinking scenario combined with a valuation-shift (negative) for the SNF industry.

 

June 21, 2017 Posted by | Skilled Nursing | , , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on SNFs and Stranded Assets